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INTRODUCTION 
 
Research question & motivation 
 
For this thesis, I will be answering the question how discourses of nationalism and nation building are 
propagated in the Kyrgyz film Kurmanjan Datka (2014). I have become interested in Central Asia 
since I started my MA in Modern Middle Eastern studies, where I participated in a course on the Silk 
Road and the connections between the Middle East and the Far East. This course focused on material 
culture, memory and commemoration in Central Asia. I found that Central Asia has an incredibly rich 
history which influenced Asia, the Middle East and Europe greatly. The historical importance of the 
region has been researched extensively. Some research on contemporary Kyrgyzstan is done – mainly 
focussed on its political development after the Soviet decades – but this is in no way comparable to 
the vast body of knowledge on pre-Soviet Central Asia. 
When addressing Kyrgyzstan I have chosen to focus on nationalism, nation building and 
national identity because I find these incredibly interesting phenomena. I have encountered 
nationalism and nation building in different regions of the world throughout my academic education. 
For my MA in Modern Middle Eastern studies, I learned about nation building in the Middle East in 
the 20th century after the era of colonization and imperialism. In Turkey, Egypt and Iraq, nationalism 
emerged quickly, based on language or culture. Arab Nationalism was at its height in the 1950s, 
promoting the unity of the Arab people and their common history, literature and culture.  
When it comes to Central Asia, nationalism and nation building have greatly affected the 
region’s history. The Russian influence of the late 19th and 20th century has changed parts of Central 
Asia irreversibly. Just as Africa and the Middle East, Central Asia was divided into nations with 
arbitrary borders that crossed through cultures and communities. After Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained their independence in the early 1990s, the large 
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encompassing political Soviet system dissolved and left a political vacuum which was to be filled by 
the new nations themselves. The Soviet lifestyle still prevails today. 
Kyrgyzstan has different national figures or heroes, including Kurmanjan Datka. In this thesis, 
I will focus on her as a historical heroine and figure of national pride. Kurmanjan (1811-1907) became 
a governor – datka – of several Kyrgyz tribes after her husband died in 1865. During her lifetime, the 
Tsarist regime expanded southwards into modern day Kyrgyzstan. Kurmanjan Datka united the 
Kyrgyz tribes against the Russian threat, a fight which she could not win eventually.  
The film Kurmanjan Datka: Queen of the Mountains (2014) tells the story of her life. It was 
released on Kyrgyzstan’s Independence Day, August 31st. It broke box office records and was played 
in cinemas for over six months. It was submitted for the Oscars in the category for Best Foreign 
Language Film in the same year and it was the most expensive film ever made in Kyrgyzstan, with a 
budget of $1,5 million. The story of Kurmanjan gained immense popularity since the release of the 
film. It is a good example of a cultural expression of nationalism and how this is propagated through 
mass media to increase national cohesion around a popular historical figure. The heroine of the film 
unites the divided tribes and for this reason Kurmanjan Datka is remembered as ulut enesi, Mother of 
the Kyrgyz nation.  
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the introduction continues with an explanation of the theoretical framework and 
the literature review. I clarify the choices I have made for the research and then clarify some of the 
important works in the studying of nationalism and nation building. This part is followed by a 
descriptive chapter on the history of Kyrgyzstan. This contains the early history of the Kyrgyz people, 
the development and influence of different empires, the Silk Roads trade, the Russian colonization 
and Soviet Era. 
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The body of the thesis contains three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze the life and 
times of Kurmanjan Datka. It explains in what historical time she lived and the things she did that 
contributed to her role as a national Kyrgyz heroine.  
The second chapter covers the political developments and nation building of Kyrgyzstan since 
the independence. Modern Kyrgyzstan is shaped by its history, yet also attempts are made to regain 
some of its lost identity and lost traditions. The state has launched multiple projects in an effort to 
unite the divided population. Several of these projects will be discussed.  
In the third chapter, I bring together Kurmanjan Datka and the Kyrgyz attempts to build their 
nation. In this chapter, I assess how the figure of Kurmanjan Datka is presented in the film and how 
she contributed to the national story of Kyrgyzstan. I pay attention to the film made about her life. It 
is the aim of this thesis to connect Kyrgyzstan’s nation building to the life and story of Kurmanjan 
Datka.  
 
 
Methodology and Theoretical framework 
 
In order to study nationalism and nation building in Kyrgyzstan and the representation of Kurmanjan 
Datka, I focus on secondary sources in English and a few in French. Unfortunately, I do not speak or 
read Kyrgyz and Russian so I am unable to utilize those sources. I have read contemporary literature 
on nationalism and nation building, but also literature specific to the region. Besides that, I studied 
the history of Central Asia and of Kyrgyzstan. By doing this, I am able discuss how history influenced 
the processes of nation building today. Throughout this process it is important to remember that one 
must always remain critical of sources. Central Asian scholars may know Central Asia and its culture 
through and through, but for scholars from outside the region it is for example easier to remain 
objective. This is closely related to the fact that I am unable to read several books in their original 
language and I depend in those cases on translations into English or French.   
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It is impossible to study a country without studying the relations with its neighbours and the 
rest of the world. As this analysis focuses on Kyrgyzstan, other regions or neighbouring states will be 
included only in so far as they are relevant to the Kyrgyz context. This will mostly concern Russia and 
the surrounding republics Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The whole region of 
Central Asia is important when speaking of broad history before Kyrgyzstan became a state. Locally 
speaking, the Alai Mountains will take a role as this is the region where most of Kurmanjan’s life took 
place. Other significant places are the Kokand khanate (1709-1883) and the city of Osh. 
 
 
 
Map 1 Caucasus and Central Asia (2009) 
9 
 
 
Map 2 Kyrgyzstan (2011) 
 
The timeframe of the thesis is quite broad. Kurmanjan Datka was born in 1811. Yet, to understand 
what Kurmanjan Datka means in contemporary Kyrgyzstan and what place she holds in Kyrgyz 
history, a short history of Kyrgyzstan needs to be told. Nation building began for most Central Asian 
states within the Soviet framework during their period as Soviet Socialist Republics. When these new 
nations became independent in the early 1990s, this nation building changed to building national 
identities. 
Additionally, I have studied the life of Kurmanjan Datka. Her story is told in the film, but I 
have also used written sources. To analyze the film, I have made an overview containing a basic 
description of each scene. I have described vital scenes in more detail and copied significant 
dialogues and speeches.  
Concluding, this thesis will be a case study analysis of the application of the theories of 
nation building on the film Kurmanjan Datka and aims to connect her as a figure to these theories. 
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Literature review 
 
Nationalism has been described and explained in many different ways by scholars throughout time. It 
is a concept difficult to define as it can be characterized as an ideology, a theory of political 
legitimacy, a mass sentiment and a political principle. ‘Nations’ are usually described as collectives of 
people who have certain things in common – such as a language or religion – and who connect 
through their identity, shared history or geographical place within a defined territory. Within the 
nation people consider themselves to be an actual unit, whether this is based on truth or 
imagination. The role of homogenization and universal education are influential as they make 
otherwise diverse groups or existing inequality increasingly indistinguishable. Nationalism supposedly 
overcomes religious, political and class differences, creating complete cohesion amongst all citizens 
in a unified national whole. It is presented as an empowering process of formation and maintenance 
of the nation where people consciously belong to.1 
One of the key works on nationalism and nation building is Imagined Communities by 
Benedict Anderson. In this book, anthropologist and political scientist Anderson explains how states 
were born out of modernization. Nations developed in Europe due to industrialization and modern 
means of communication which replaced religious culture. There are however three paradoxes 
around the concept ‘nation’ and nationalism in itself, that are discussed in Anderson’s introduction of 
Imagined Communities. In the first place, nationalists think of the nation as ancient in a subjective 
way, while historians see the objective modernity of nations. Secondly, there seems to be the 
conviction amongst nationalists that nationalism is a universal phenomenon, which acts as a socio-
cultural concept in the sense that everybody has a nationality. Anderson argues at the same time that 
each nationality is different. The third paradox of nationalism is the ‘political’ power it has versus its 
                                                             
1
 P. Albanese, Mothers of the Nation: Women, Families and Nationalism in twentieth-century Europe (Toronto 
2000) 10.  
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philosophical poverty. ‘Nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers’ in the way for 
example socialism or modernism have, according to Anderson.2  
Anderson continues to explain that ‘nationalism’, ‘nationality’ and ‘nation’ are terms that are 
difficult to define, yet he does come up with a definition of ‘nation’ himself that states that a nation: 
‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’3 The 
reason Anderson considers nations to be imagined, is that even in small nations inhabitants will 
never know most of the other inhabitants, yet at the same time they sense a feeling of community in 
their minds. People choose to consider themselves a community and therefore form a nation.  
Finally, Anderson considers the nation an imagined community because the nation is 
conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.4 This essentially creates a feeling of fraternity despite 
actual existing inequalities and exploitation. Anderson briefly connects this feeling to the many wars 
and conflicts over the past two centuries that were inspired by nationalism and he wonders how it is 
possible that these imagined ideas generated these immense sacrifices. 
A second work that is highly relevant to the discussion of my thesis is written by the 
historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, titled The Invention of Tradition. In this book, the 
authors explain the invention of tradition as a concept that argues that many traditions which 
‘appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.’5 Especially in the 
modern development of nations, this phenomenon contributes to fabricating a national identity, 
legitimacy and promotes a feeling of unity in a community or nation. Modern nations fabricate 
ancient stories – rooted in history – to establish continuity between the past and the present.  
An example given by Hobsbawm and Ranger is the Highland tradition of Scotland. The idea of 
kilts, clans and a distinct Highland culture is a recent invention.6 The ‘kilt’ as we know it today first 
appeared in the 18th century, yet we think of this Highland culture as an ancient way of celebrating 
                                                             
2 B. Anderson, Imagined communities (London 2016) 5. 
3 Anderson, Imagined communities 6. 
4
 Anderson, Imagined communities 7. 
5
 E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, Invented tradition (Cambridge 2016) 1. 
6 Hobsbawm, Invented tradition 15. 
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distinct national identity. A second example is the rebuilding of the British parliament after World 
War II in a 19th century Gothic style. This implies continuity with the past, although not necessarily an 
ancient past.  
Hobsbawm and Ranger claim that this way of creating continuity with the past occurs mostly 
when societies go through rapid transformations in which old patterns are weakened or even 
destroyed. In this case, old traditions are no longer applicable or the institutions that promoted them 
are no longer adaptable or flexible. The authors note that ‘such changes have been particularly 
significant in the past 200 years, and it is therefore reasonable to expect these instant formalizations 
of new traditions to cluster during this period.’7 When old traditions cannot be used or adapted, new 
traditions are created.  
Hobsbawm and Ranger conclude their introduction by dividing invented traditions in three 
categories. The first category of invented traditions is those traditions that should symbolize or 
establish social cohesion in a group. The second category consists of those traditions that establish or 
legitimize the institutions, status or relations of an authoritative body, such as a government. The 
third category incorporates invented traditions with the main purpose of socialization, the 
inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.8  
When studying invented traditions a wider study of a nation’s history of society is necessary. 
Invented traditions show a society’s relation to the past and how history can be a tool for creating 
legitimacy and group cohesion. Even revolutionary movements rely on their own past, their own 
culture and their own heroes and martyrs. This connection to the past – as Anderson also argued – is 
fabricated to contribute to the idea that a certain nation naturally formed out of ancient roots. In 
reality, modern nations are quite novel and fabricated, like the states of Central Asia. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the invention of tradition when studying nationalism and nation building.  
Besides traditions, new symbols and devices are introduced as part of national states, such as 
a standard national language, a national anthem, a flag or the personification of the nation in a 
                                                             
7
 Hobsbawm, Invented tradition 5. 
8 Hobsbawm, Invented tradition 9. 
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symbol or image. This personification can be either official, such as Germania and Marianne, but also 
in stereotype cartoons, such as Uncle Sam or John Bull.9 When associated with these elements and 
various symbols, people become conscious of their citizenship.  
A figure that represents the nation requires certain character traits. Franco Zeno and Kathy 
Blau made an analysis of what makes a good hero. In their article Heroism: A Conceptual Analysis and 
Differentiation between Heroic Action and Altruism, they describe heroism as ‘the apex of human 
behaviour’. One becomes a hero when one acts in ‘a pro-social manner despite personal risk.’10 Zeno 
and Blue argue that heroes are associated with courageous or brave actions and the willingness to 
act in dangerous situation. Besides this, heroism always involves a level of physical peril or personal 
sacrifice. Saving others, putting ones live at stake to fight injustice or a call of martial duty can all 
contribute to this.  
In the article, Zeno and Blue identify different subtypes of heroes, that help to identify what 
sort of heroic subtype is needed in a certain situation. For example, Kyrgyz national hero Manas fits 
in several categories as an individual that exposes himself to high military risks. We can place 
Kurmanjan Datka also in multiple hero subtype categories which will be discussed later on.11  
 
 
Nationalistic Symbols 
 
Nationalism and nation building are partially expressed through symbols. As explained, these 
symbols represent the national community and intend to create a unifying feeling through visual 
representation of national values, history or people. The most well known symbols feature national 
anthems, flags and languages, but can also include a national colour, myth, sport, flower, animal or 
                                                             
9 Germania is the personification of the German nation, Marianne is France’s national symbol of liberty and 
reason, Uncle Sam is an American national figure and John Bull is a British figure of freedom and loyalty. 
10
 E. Zeno and K. Blau, ‘Heroism: A Conceptual Analysis and Differentiation Between Heroic Action and 
Altruism’, Review of General Psychology 15 (2011) 99. 
11 Zeno and Blau, ‘Heroism’ 102. 
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the connection to a certain territory. Other ways of nation building become visible through ‘new’ or 
less conventional analytical tools, like elections, personality cults or – in my case – cinema.12 They all 
in their own way contribute to national identity formation. Besides these symbols, other elements 
can be part of national identity, such as religion and ethnicity.  
History also cannot be overlooked. Each nation searches for – or creates – its own historical 
roots and possibly a prominent place in history. History provides answers to the questions ‘who are 
we?’ and ‘where do we come from?’ which are essentially the bedrock of a people’s or nation’s 
identity. These unifying elements, historical narratives and symbols can be expressed by the state in 
various ways, such as mandatory conscription, museums, mass education, mass celebrations and 
propaganda.  
 
 
Nationalism and women 
 
Many of the above mentioned hegemonic theorizations on nationalism and nations ignore gender 
and gender relations. When studying a female figure like Kurmanjan Datka and her role in nation 
building, it is essential to analyze connections between nationalism and gender. Nira Yuval-Davis has 
written extensively on nationalism, but also studied racism, citizenship and identity. In her work 
Gender and Nation, she systematically examines the contribution of gender ‘into several major 
dimensions of nationalist projects: national reproduction, national culture and national citizenship’.13 
She argues that constructions of nationalism and nations have specific notions of both ‘manhood’ 
and ‘womanhood’, which means that within the nation men and women have ‘natural’ roles to fulfil. 
Men are associated with civilization, culture and the public sphere. Women are more identified with 
nature and exclusion from the civilized public political domain because they are considered part of 
                                                             
12
 R. Isaacs and A. Polese, ‘Between “Imagined” and “Real” nation building: identities and nationhood in post-
Soviet Central Asia’, Nationalities Papers 43 (2015) 376. 
13 N. Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London 1997) 3. 
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the private sphere of the family. The family is like the micro-cosmos of the state and captivates ideal 
moral order and social solidarity.14  
Within the family, women are viewed as wives and mothers and symbolize continuity and 
purity. Women are in charge of keeping the family honour intact, with a particular focus on sexual 
honour. Reproduction is not purely a biological notion – that of bearing children – but also a cultural 
notion as mothers are viewed to be responsible also for transmitting values and moral. Women’s 
reproductive roles are fundamental in nationalist discourses when one considers how origin and 
background are pivotal in the construction of ethnic or national collectives.15 According to Patrizia 
Albanese reproduction and child-bearing are of strategic importance for nationalists and mothers – 
in their role of preserving traditions –  need to be controlled as a way of protecting the nation. 
Albanese concludes that women participate in five ways in ethnic and national processes. They are 
first of all the biological reproducers of the community. Secondly, they are the reproducers of 
boundaries of these groups and thirdly women are the transmitters of culture and tradition. Fourthly, 
women are considered the signifiers of ethnic differences and fifthly they participate in national, 
economic, political and military struggles.16 
In traditional nationalist gender roles, women are linked to origin and therefore the basis of 
national identity. In her article Muslim Women and Nationalism, Christiane Timmerman gives the 
example of how the symbolism of ‘mother and father’ is used to represent the nation, as ‘women 
may symbolize the nation, but men represent it.’17 It is also for this reason that in Central Asian 
countries the personification of the nation is feminine; the nation is referred to as ‘the Motherland’ 
instead of ‘the Fatherland’ or the more neutral ‘Homeland’. The word ‘father’ is related to strength 
and power, whereas ‘mother’ is naturally associated with nurturing, birth and fertility. 
                                                             
14 C. Timmerman, ‘Muslim Women and Nationalism: The Power of the Image’, Current Sociology 48 (October 
2000) 17. 
15
 Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation 26. 
16
 Albanese, Mothers of the Nation 17. 
17 Timmerman, ‘Muslim Women and Nationalism’ 17. 
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Then follows the question how exceptional women – such as Kurmanjan Datka – fit in these 
views on gender and nationalism. In an interview with the president of the Kyrgyz History Society 
Tyntchtykbek Tchoroev about Kurmanjan Datka, Tchoroev admits there were a few other female 
datka’s in the first half of the 19th century, but none who compared to Kurmanjan. The reason is that 
Kurmanjan’s authority as a female leader in an all-male environment was recognized by Kokand, 
Bukhara and Russia. Tchoroev even compares her to contemporary women in Asian politics, such as 
Indira Ghandi and Benazir Bhutto.18 
Even in contemporary Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is so far the only country to have had a female 
president. Roza Otunbayeva has been ambassador to the US, foreign minister of Kyrgyzstan and took 
on the role of interim president after violent protests had broken out in April 2010 that ousted the 
government of President Kurmanbek Bakiev. However, she herself was also a part of the entire 
governmental system, which is generally branded as corrupt.  
After looking at the theories behind nationalism and nation building, it becomes clear that 
there is a lot to consider when we use them. Nationalism and nation building promote and create a 
feeling of unity within a nation and this is expressed for example through symbols, national figures, 
traditions and institutions. However, whether nation building can succeed is a second question. In 
Kyrgyzstan, it is a difficult case. People identify themselves in terms of their religion or their local clan 
or tribe and not in terms of their civic identity. It is therefore challenging to create one identity where 
all people relate to. The past of the Kyrgyz people and the Kyrgyz state have greatly contributed to 
the present situation. The next chapter will give an overview of this history. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Indira Ghandi was prime minister of India from 1966 to 1977 and again from 1980 to 1984. Benazir Bhutto 
was prime minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990 and from 1993 to 1996. | Qishloq Ovozi, ‘Who was 
Kurmanjan Datka and What Does She Mean to the Kyrgyz People?’ (version 31 December 2014) 
https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-who-was-kurmanjan-datka/26770979.html (27 February 2018). 
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Religion 
 
Central Asia is predominately Muslim, but this does not mean the region is homogenous. Islam came 
to Central Asia between the 9th and 15th century through traders and warriors from Persia, Arabia 
and the Turkic regions. The conversion to Islam took several centuries as it was a slow process that 
started in the south and gradually made its way north. This slow course was partially caused by the 
fact that in Central Asia other religions had already long existed, such as Zoroastrianism, Christianity, 
Manichaeism and Judaism. Besides these, the region had also beliefs of shamanism and animism 
which had been introduced by Mongol and Turkic tribes. Animism is a broad view of the world that 
connects ‘innumerable spiritual beings concerned with human affairs’ that are capable of harming or 
helping human interests. Animals, plants, objects and even locations are considered alive and contain 
spiritual essence.19 The fact that elements of animism are visible in the film proves that these beliefs 
remain important in Kyrgyzstan till the present day.20 This is possible because the majority of 
Muslims in Central Asia follow the Sunni Hanafi school, a school that is generally described as 
tolerant and adaptable.21 Central Asian Islam also has a considerable tradition of the practice of 
Sufism and Central Asia was the birthplace of several Sufi orders, including the well-known 
Naqshbandiya.22 The visiting and worshipping of shrines is still an important element of Central Asian 
Islam.  
However, according to Devin DeWeese it remains difficult to identify and interpret Central 
Asian religion before and during the introduction of Islam. The relative scarcity of indigenous sources 
prior to the recordings of oral tradition in the 19th and 20th century is the most obvious reason.23 The 
available sources we rely on are mostly accounts left by missionaries, travellers and geographers 
                                                             
19
 None of the major world religions are animistic, however some of them contain animistic characteristics. 
Most other religions are animistic and this counts specifically for religions of tribal peoples all over the world 
and also in Central Asia. | E. Pauls, ‘Animism’ (version 2 February 2007), 
https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/animism/109469 (31 July 2018). 
20 S. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations (New York 2012) 24. 
21
 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia 100. 
22
 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia 101. 
23 D. DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde (Pennsylvania 1994) 29. 
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from other civilizations who are inevitable influenced by their own environment and are often 
characterized by misunderstanding or idealization. In this way, we see the religion of Central Asia 
only through the vision of outsiders.  
Moreover, DeWeese argues that our knowledge is limited due to the fact that – in 
comparison to other “aboriginal peoples” (tuzemtsy) – the Central Asian peoples ‘have not enjoyed 
the same level or quality of scholarly attention.’24 The academic study of religion was stunted for 
most of the 20th century because the region was incorporated into the Soviet Union. And even 
though the Soviets worked on a large number of ethnographic studies, these studies showed general 
hostility towards religion which was characterized as ‘superstition’ and signs of backwardness and 
primitiveness which was ‘to be abandoned  by progressive thinkers.’25  
Today, 94% of Kyrgyzstan’s population identifies as Muslim.26 In the chapter The Social 
Significance of Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia, in a recent book on Central Asian Islam, Rouslan Jalil 
argues that most studies about Islam in the region are focused on ‘every day’ Islam.27 The local 
element is crucial to understand the role of religion in the region. Jalil explains how folk Islam is 
regarded as a true Islam, even though it only faintly resembles the normative scriptural Islam. The 
reason is that this folk Islam gets its legitimacy from various sources, such as traditions, popular 
beliefs, legends and the veneration of saints. ‘Being a good Muslim’ has a different meaning in 
Central Asia than it has in other parts of the world. Adeeb Khalid states that ‘being Muslim came to 
mean adherence to certain local cultural norms and traditions rather than adherence to structures 
that were directly validated by the learned religion.’28 There is less emphasis on the Five Pillars of 
Islam and more emphasis on the fluidity of Islam. In Kyrgyzstan, it is assumed that religious beliefs 
are therefore relatively shallow.29  
                                                             
24 DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde 30. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan’ (version 3 January 2018), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kg.html (11 April 2018). 
27
 P. Jones, (ed.), Islam, Society and Politics in Central Asia (Pittsburgh 2017) 7. 
28
 A. Khalid, Islam After Communism (Berkeley 2014) 83. 
29 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia 100. 
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An explanation for this comes from Julie McBrien in her book From Belonging to Belief. With 
her anthropology background, she has done many years of fieldwork in Central Asia and explores 
how Islam is lived and debated. In her book, McBrien demonstrates that Soviet atheism and post-
Soviet secularism have influenced people’s lives as Muslims and their interpretation of Islam. She 
studied the rituals and the ideas people articulate and argues that religion in Central Asia is 
sometimes essentially a matter of belonging and not only a matter of belief.30  
After the fall of communism, some scholars detected an Islamic revival. This revival stresses a 
continuation or re-emergence of certain practises of Islam, such as Sufism, the visiting of shrines and 
a revival of the importance of scripture. Though, argued by Khalid, ‘the Islamic revival remains largely 
a phenomenon of cultural rediscovery.’31 Because of Soviet policies in the past, Muslim identity had 
fused with notions of national identity. National expressions of identity, such as national dress, 
dishes or holidays, had also become Muslim expressions.32 Islam came to be viewed as a bridge to 
national identity. Muslims were now able to re-establish formerly banned values and expressions. 
Religious belief definitely contributes to a sense of national identity and a common cultural 
heritage.33 
 
 
  
                                                             
30 J. McBrien, From Belonging to Belief: Modern Secularisms and the Construction of Religion in Kyrgyzstan 
(Pittsburgh 2017). 
31 A. Khalid, ‘A secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 35 (2003) 586. 
32
 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia 102. 
33
 A. Amanbayeva, ‘The Collision of Islam and Terrorism in Central Asia’, Asian Journal of Criminology 4 (2009) 
172. 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KYRGYZSTAN 
 
Early history 
 
History and background play an important role in relation to identity and nationalism as it is 
presented as the origin of a people or a nation. The Kyrgyz are considered one of the ancient peoples 
of Central Asia, according to Tabyldy Akerov who wrote Ancient Kyrgyz and the Great Steppe. Based 
on archaeological research, inscriptions and several Chinese sources, the history of the ancient 
Kyrgyz is connected to different nomadic tribes from all over Central Asia, such as the Yenisei, the 
Tien Shan, Saks, but also the Mongols and the Eastern Turks. Throughout history, the Kyrgyz have 
been able to form several independent khanates.34 It was in the 6th and 7th century that Yenisei 
Kyrgyz established an independent state which existed until the Mongol invasion in the 13th century. 
The centre of this khanate was in southern Siberia. This state was supported by mining, metallurgy 
and handicraft. It was in this state that the first written Kyrgyz language was formed.35 
John Anderson argues that the early history of the Kyrgyz people remains a subject of 
controversy. He disagrees with Akerov and states that some of the forerunners of the Kyrgyz were 
indeed from the Yenisei river region but notes that these groups had originally emigrated from 
Central Asia. They were forced to migrate again to the south as the Mongol armies were advancing in 
the 12th century. 
In the 13th century an identifiable ‘Kyrgyz’ people were unable to escape the Mongol 
domination and found itself located in the territory of Chingiz Khan’s son Chagatai.36 An independent 
khanate emerged in the 15th century, as the power of the Mongols declined. This was however not a 
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state with a national consciousness as we know it today. Tribal and kinship ties were the basis of 
social organization.37 
Kyrgyz history is partially undocumented due to the fact that the ancient Kyrgyz were 
nomadic people for centuries and consisted of a mix of different tribes and clans. The nomadic 
people of Central Asia have no tradition of building homes or other monumental buildings and tend 
to keep landscapes untouched. There were only few cities in the region – such as Samarkand and 
Bukhara – but more cities did not really sprout until the Silk Road trade began. 
Uncertainty about the early history of Kyrgyzstan has a second reason, namely the fact that 
the early Kyrgyz people based their history on oral traditions and not on written material, with the 
exception of some runic inscriptions. Most of our knowledge of the Kyrgyz came from sources from 
other peoples, mainly Chinese sources. They tell us for example that the ancient Kyrgyz empire was 
situated, ‘from Khami to the West, from Khorashara to the North, at the White Mountains.’38 
According to Akerov, the runic inscriptions mostly contain legendary stories that testify how the 
Kyrgyz ‘bore all burdens of wartime and always aspired to independence.’39 These would later be 
used to support Kyrgyz nationalism. 
Each tribe or clan developed its own narratives about mythical ancestors, origin and 
memorable events of the past. Epic poetry was – and is still today – a very important part of Kyrgyz 
culture. It reflects an ideological basis and represents the tribe’s way of living, genealogy, customs 
and traditions. Often such legends – whether Asian, European or American – contain tragic elements 
or collective traumas. In most cases, a hero, prince or a successor of a dynasty rises up and saves the 
people for a new beginning. According to Akerov, ‘the propaganda of the history of forming national 
statehood with the elements of the general tragedy touched feelings of the common people.’40 We 
can say that these genealogical legendary stories propagandize the unification of a people, led by a 
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heroic leader who guides them to independence. This structure works as a blueprint for legends all 
over the world and therefore also in Central Asia. 
The Manas epic is the best known example of epic poetry that reveals the history of the 
Kyrgyz people. The epic is over 1000 years old and was transmitted orally from generation to 
generation before it was written down in the 20th century. The Manas epic was then elevated to the 
national epic of Kyrgyzstan. It tells the story of Manas, who fought with his 40 tribes against the 
enemies of his people. The poem is longer than the Iliad and the Odyssey combined and the idea of 
the powerful avenger has sustained the tribes over the centuries in their fights against the Mongols, 
Russians and others.41 
The 1000 year old epic is often used to claim the presence of the Kyrgyz people in the 
region.42 Many of the events in the epic are believed to have taken place close to the territory of 
modern day Kyrgyzstan. It confirms the presence of Kyrgyz tribes in the establishing of the 
Karakhanid khanate (840-1212).43 In 1995, Kyrgyzstan celebrated the 1000th anniversary of the epic 
poem. 
 
 
Part of the greater entities 
 
Apart from the khanates in the first millennium, during most of their history, the Kyrgyz people have 
been part of greater empires, such as the Persian Samanid Empire (819-999), the Mongol Empire 
(1206-1368) and the Timurid Empire (1370-1507) that dominated Central Asia. 
The Silk Routes haphazardly connected the ancient Mediterranean and Han-China, but 
remained a vital element of Central Asia throughout history. Local traders along the route acquired 
great wealth and the cities of Central Asia such as Bukhara, Samarkand and Kokand became centres 
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of local trade.44 The Kyrgyz controlled several roads and mountain passages and therefore benefitted 
from this trade. It was also in this time that Islam began to spread in Central Asia by Persian, Arab 
and Turkic warriors and traders who travelled the Silk Routes. The Kyrgyz began to convert to Islam, 
but it would eventually be a long and slow process which would take several centuries. 
It wasn’t until between the 15th and 17th century that the Kyrgyz tribes began to consolidate 
their culture and grew into a proto-nation. This process ‘reached an advanced state by the beginning 
of the 19th century.’45 However, there was no sense of a strong national identity or political unity. 
People continued to live in tribes and were geographically divided due to mountain ranges. These 
mountain ranges of Central Asia – the Tien Shan and the Pamiro-Alai mountains – stretch from the 
east to the west and southwest – between Kyrgyzstan and China. These mountain ranges have been 
the home of the Kyrgyz for centuries, and they formed the basis of their pastoral nomadism. There 
were only a few mountain passes and therefore communication was limited among the different 
Kyrgyz tribes which were spread over 5 valleys: Chui, Ferghana, Issyk Kul, Naryn and Talas.46 
A very significant period in Kyrgyz history is the Tsarist colonization of the late 19th century. 
Kyrgyz tribes were looking for an ally in their fight against the Uzbek communities from the Kokand 
Khanate in the 1800s. It would not be until the second half of the 19th century that the Russians 
would become more involved in Central Asia. Their expansion was part of the Great Game, a race for 
influence in Asia against the British – who had already established their control over northern India 
and had begun to push into Afghanistan. The region of Central Asia that incorporated Kyrgyz territory 
– known as Turkestan – was in the middle of the two great powers and both were aware of the Silk 
Road cities’ wealth. 
The Russians increased their grip on Turkestan when the clash of two cultures – imperial 
Russia and nomadic Central Asia – made it difficult for the Russians to conquer the area. The Kyrgyz 
had a nomadic tradition and viewed the land as property of all people. Russian and Ukrainian settlers 
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however were given land by the Tsarist government to own privately and by this they obstructed the 
old pattern of cattle herding.47 From the 1860s to the 1880s, an estimated 3.500 families were 
forcefully transported to and settled in modern day Kyrgyzstan and their numbers continued to grow. 
Partially, their job was to encourage ‘civilized’ ways of farming and to become the dominant group in 
the new urban centres.48 Russian colonies sprouted along the new railways that transported large 
quantities of raw resources.49 Central Asian agriculture became a monoculture which harmed the 
native population and their way of life. Agriculture remained the most important occupation for the 
indigenous Kyrgyz. 
It was in this age that Kurmanjan Datka comes to the stage and united the southern Kyrgyz 
tribes against the Tsarist expansions. Her story will be described more elaborately in chapter 1. 
As Russia’s influence over Central Asia was growing, so did rebellion by the locals. Especially 
in the years before and during the Great War, the Kyrgyz rebelled against forced conscription and 
against Russian settlers taking their land and livestock. A revolt in 1916 resulted in many casualties as 
a Cossack army killed tens of thousands of Kyrgyz and burned down their villages. Many Kyrgyz fled 
to the Tien Shan mountains, in Chinese Turkestan, as a last place of refuge.50 It is estimated that this 
collective trauma may have cost the Kyrgyz people almost a quarter of their population. 
 
 
Soviet Russia and the National Delimitations 
 
Probably the most decisive moment in modern Russian history – the 1917 revolutions – affected 
Central Asia greatly. In the late 1910s Russia went through a series of revolutions that resulted in the 
fall of the Tsarist regime and the creation of the world’s first communist state led by the Soviets. It is 
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still considered one of the most decisive moments of modern Russian history and had major 
consequences domestically and internationally, also for Central Asia. Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894-1917) 
had lost his charm with the people as a result of corruption, shortages and continuous dissolution of 
the Duma, the Russian parliament.51 
The Soviets came to power after a coup d’état on the Provisional Government in November 
1917 and to consolidate their claim to power, they withdrew from World War I. This allowed them to 
establish a military presence in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan became part of the Turkestan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian federation and Bishkek – renamed Frunze – became the 
capital in 1925.52 Yet, the creation of these artificial borders did not stop there, because only a year 
later, Kyrgyzstan was reorganized into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This process 
of creating clear defined boundaries in Central Asia was called the ‘National-Territorial Delimitation’ 
and lasted from the early 1920s till 1936.53 It was finally in 1936 that the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist 
Republic was formed. 
The creation of these new republics was accompanied by the creation of the respective 
nations themselves. Up until this moment, the modern idea of a ‘nation’ had been completely alien 
to Central Asia.54 There had been different forms of statehood, such as the Emirate of Bukhara and 
Khanate of Khiva, but they were not modern sovereign states as understood in the Westphalian 
sense until the national delimitation established them as distinct national territorial units. The 
sovereignty of the new states was however profoundly circumscribed.55 The delimitation process is a 
product of the paradoxical nature of the Soviet Union, according to Rico Isaacs and Abel Polese. Their 
article Between “imagined” and “real” nation-building’ on identities and nationhood in post-Soviet 
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Central Asia argues that on the one hand, Moscow promoted rights to national groups in their new 
nations. On the other hand, all these peoples had to integrate in the overarching Soviet identity. 
Ethnographic and statistical surveys had been done in all regions of Central Asia, to establish 
a basis for the expected redrawing of boundaries. The new states were to be based on the largest 
ethnic group in that area which gave its name the given republic. It was an attempt to host national 
cultures in national boundaries and in order to achieve this, language was taken as the prime marker 
of identity. Robert Lowe argues in his article that – despite certain irregularities like the Ferghana 
Valley – these national unities were fairly accurate as 86% of all ethnic Kyrgyz lived in the new Kyrgyz 
territory.56 Sally Cummings states in her work Understanding Central Asia that these delimitations 
were part of a large divide-and-rule policy to avoid that any of the republics would become too 
independent or too powerful.57 This is also pointed out by Yuri Bregel, who wrote and drew A 
Historical Atlas of Central Asia, and notes that the national delimitation had to take in account ‘not 
only languages, but also economic factors and (sometimes above all) the often conflicting interests of 
influential groups of Communist leaders in the republics.’58 
Under the control of Moscow, the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK) was established and 
it was dominated by Russian migrants. Kyrgyz communists could not even enter the party and any 
other form of union was prohibited. Purges targeted nationalist groups and the Kyrgyz Poor Peasants 
Union. Their members were either exiled or imprisoned. Within only two decades, the Soviets had 
established their power over Kyrgyz politics and society through the CPK. In the later decades of the 
Soviet rule, the first party representative was allowed to be someone from the ‘titular nationality’, of 
the republic. However, the second secretary was always a Russian who would make sure the local 
party was compliant and followed the Soviet principles.59 Any serious challenge to Soviet power 
would not arise till the 1980s. 
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Soviet culture and identity 
 
As mentioned before, the Soviets attempted to create a mass identity to incorporate the ‘backward 
people of the east.’60 The immense scheme involved far-reaching and often irreversible changes in 
political, economic and social life as well as in identity. According to the article Nation Building in the 
Kyrgyz Republic by Robert Lowe, the Soviets had a straightforward theory to deal with the different 
nationalities in Central Asia. There was to be made a distinction between ‘nationality’ – defined by 
ethnicity and genetic inheritance – and the more important issue of ‘citizenship’.61 People’s national 
identity should be encouraged, but only ‘as a component of the greater affiliation to the Union of 
Soviet Social Republics.’62 In the words of Kyrgyz author Chinghiz Aimatov (1928-2008) ‘the first 
priority at the time was to define oneself as a Soviet individual. Only after that came the question 
who one was by nationality.’63 The reason the Soviets championed the national identities was 
because in their own communist ideology, they fought for the rights of oppressed peoples, promoted 
national rights and considered themselves to be the first ‘post-imperial state’.64 The core provinces of 
the Soviet Union had countless minorities and ethnicities which all had to become part of one great 
Soviet identity in the greater communist ideology and at the same time remain part of their national 
identities.  
Yet, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Lowe argues it is unlikely that many Kyrgyz people had ever 
given any thought to the notion of ‘national identity’ before 1917. Identity was loose and based on 
tribes and clans, not comparable to any European like categories and definitions. In Cummings’ 
words: ‘Central Asians, at the broadest level of self-consciousness, considered themselves “Muslims”, 
rather than “Kyrgyz” or “Uzbek”.’65 People also made distinctions along the lines of ‘nomadic’ and 
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‘settled’. Ethnicity was not a main compartment of identity, as the Kyrgyz themselves were a people 
with a mix of various backgrounds and had throughout history coexisted in multi-ethnic empires and 
khanates. It were local affiliations and tribal ties that were the foremost elements of Kyrgyz identity. 
The Soviets, however, attempted to assimilate all Central Asians into the Soviet identity 
therefore required a structural change of society. Any form of traditional expression of identity and 
culture were stamped out. National languages were allowed to some extent, but Russian had 
become the lingua franca. In 1940, the Arab script was converted to a new Kyrgyz alphabet with 
Cyrillic letters. The Arab script had up till then been ‘the sole means of communication across Central 
Asia’ deriving from the common Turkic heritage.66 After the Second World War, an increasing 
number of Russian publications were produced in Kyrgyzstan. 
Cultural changes also affected Islam in Central Asia. Traditional Kyrgyz intelligentsia were 
eliminated in the 1920s and early 1930s by the regime of Stalin. Religious, political and tribal elite 
was also disposed of and together with the intelligentsia sent into exile to Siberia or sent to labour 
camps and prisons. The Soviet government also implemented their policy of atheism and targeted 
thousands of ulama – Islamic clergy. Religious practice was prohibited and simultaneously mosques 
and madrassas were closed or destroyed. Holy sites in the nomadic periphery were desecrated. The 
ways in which Islam had functioned in Central Asia for centuries was damaged beyond repair. The 
Soviets had no need for faith as they considered religion to be merely another cloak of repression. It 
was another ideology of exploitation, according to them.67 Anti-religious propaganda was spread 
which aimed to teach people that religion was the opposite of reason and science.68 
In his book The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Ahmed Rashid argues 
however that ‘communism initially did little to change the lifestyle of the Kyrgyz nomads.'69 
According to Rashid, people’s lifestyle had remained quite the same over centuries, because the 
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harsh conditions of life affect lifestyle far more than ideological or economic conditions do. People’s 
lives were – and are to some extent today – profoundly based on their produce of wool, milk and 
meat of their yaks and sheep. Justice was dispensed by elders on tribal courts and the main 
entertainment for people was storytelling and poetry. The Kyrgyz were able to preserve their 
religion, patriarchal society as well as their kinship and tribal traditions. 
Over time, it thus became clear that Sovietisation, Russification and nationality policies were 
not entirely successful. A gap between reality and propaganda created unrest amongst Kyrgyz 
intelligentsia. The state was not able to improve living standards and – in the industrialized cities in 
northern Kyrgyzstan – unemployment was increasing.70 It would not be until the late 1980s that 
some liberalization would be allowed under the Gorbachev regime. The demand for Kyrgyz schools, 
Kyrgyz publications and broadcasting was increasing. People also demanded that the Kyrgyz language 
would become the official state language. 
 
 
Later Soviet years 
 
Economic stagnation fuelled ethnic resentment. The demand to change the state’s language from 
Russian to Kyrgyz contributed to anti-Russian sentiments and Russians living in Kyrgyzstan became 
uncertain of their future. Many Russians eventually emigrated and their share in the Kyrgyz 
population was reduced by 20%.71 Besides the tensions felt by the Russians, bloody violence broke 
out around Osh and the surrounding area in June 1990. It was an expression of pressures that had 
been brewing for decades between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz over land disputes, employment and 
representation in government. Many people were killed on both sides as the ethnic riots spread from 
town to town.72 
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John Anderson points out that it were these growing ethnic tensions and growing concerns 
among Slavic and European groups that undermined ‘the image of Kyrgyzstan as a relatively peaceful 
corner of the USSR.’73 In October 1990 therefore, the parliament decided not to re-elect the 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Absamat Masaliyev as a new executive president, charging that ‘he 
had failed to deal with the economic crisis facing the republic and had mismanaged the events in 
Osh.’74 
Instead, the ruling Parliament chose to elect Askar Akaev, who Anderson describes as a 
‘compromise candidate.’75 He had made his career mostly outside of the Communist Party and was 
therefore perceived as being a controllable candidate. Akaev was the first elected non-communist 
president in Central Asia. He recognized the protestors by meeting with them on his second day in 
office and was in favour of reforms. Akaev announced sovereignty for Kyrgyzstan within the Soviet 
Union in December 1990 as a sort of British-style Commonwealth in which members would be more 
equal. Even small nationalist groups within Kyrgyzstan preferred this over complete independence as 
the republic depended heavily on the core of the empire. 
On the 17th of March 1991 the last Soviet-wide referendum was organized which included 
the following question: 
 
‘Do you agree that [name of republic] will enter the renewed union (Federation) as a republic 
enjoying equal rights [with others]?’76 
 
Essentially, this question asked whether the Soviet Socialist Republics wanted to remain part of the 
Soviet unity, albeit new ‘equal’ terms. Even at this stage of the ongoing implosion of the Soviet 
Empire, the Central Asian states still voted for retention of the Union – all with percentages over 90. 
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In other parts of the Soviet Empire, the opposite happened. In July 1990, it was Lithuania that 
became the first republic to declare its independence. 
Kyrgyz president Akaev declared full independence for Kyrgyzstan immediately after the August 
1991 coup against the Gorbachev regime. He prevented local communists from attempting a coup of 
their own and openly supported Boris Yeltsin. The Communist Party Kyrgyzstan was banned and 
Akaev run unopposed in the next presidential elections of 1991. 
Concluding we can say that Kyrgyz history is turbulent. The Kyrgyz founded independent 
khanates of the first millennium and profited from the Silk Road trade through the mountains. In this 
period, their distinct identity and language began to emerge. Because of their nomadic lifestyle and 
the sharing of land, the Kyrgyz did not leave any monumental buildings behind and due to the 
tradition of oral history and epic poetry only few scriptures were found. Other major empires 
conquered Central Asia in the following centuries and eventually the Tsarist army of the Russians 
made its ways south. After the 1917 Russian revolution the Soviets took control, Central Asia was to 
be changed forever. Nation states were fabricated and the Russians influenced culture, education, 
politics and the economy. Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991, but this does not mean that the 
story and influence of the Soviet decades ended. President Akaev would be the one to guide the 
diverse people to a new Kyrgyzstan. 
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CHAPTER 1: Kurmanjan’s era 
 
Kurmanjan and the historical context 
 
In order to study the life of Kurmanjan Datka and her role in Kyrgyz nation building, we need to be 
able to place her in the correct historical setting. During her lifetime, Central Asia and the modern 
territory of Kyrgyzstan dealt with several challenges. This chapter describes the historical context in 
which Kurmanjan lived and gives the necessary biographical information. 
When Kurmanjan was born in 1811, contemporary Kyrgyzstan did not yet exist. In the 18th 
and 19th century Central Asia was experiencing a period of stagnation and political chaos. The trade 
between East and West declined as it had to compete with emerging European maritime trade. 
However, we stay critical of such labels of stagnation and decline as they are European perceptions 
of political and economic chaos. In his work Russian Rule in Samarkand, Morrison actually describes 
this period in Turkestan as a time of political and economic dynamism.77 It is true that many of the 
great empires that had existed disappeared and some regions experienced a decline in population 
and urbanization, but the rise of the Khanate of Kokand in the Ferghana valley is an example of how 
not everything was stagnating.  
Kokand had been re-founded in 1740 and had 80.000 inhabitants by 1867. The population 
grew partially as waves of refugees were fleeing Kazakh and Persian invasions in their own regions.78 
Kokand gained wealth from its trading arrangements with Russian and especially China where over 
48 trading missions were sent in the second half of the 18th century. The khanate was also able to 
create great tracts of cultivatable land due to a successful irrigation system which it used to exercise 
leverage over the Kyrgyz and others. This wealth and control over resources – especially water – 
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eventually resulted in Kokand becoming the dominant power in the Ferghana Valley in 1800.79 
Further to the north, Tashkent traded with its northern neighbours across the Kazakh Steppe: Russia 
and Siberia. Emirate Bukhara remained the important trading centre it had been throughout this 
period and its population is estimated to have been between 80.000 and 100.000.80 
However, the modernized armies of Kokand and the other Khanates were no match for the 
advancing Russian troops coming from the north. The fighting amongst each other had left the 
Khanates weak and an easy prey for Russia. After the Crimean War (1853-1856) – which had 
distracted the Russian conquest temporarily – the Russian armies expanded into Central Asia and 
disrupted the political environment. Scott Levi argues that the Russian motivation mainly concerned 
imperialistic ambition and the desire to ‘transform Central Asia into a cotton-producing periphery.’81 
 
 
Image 2 Russian Conquest of Central Asia (1820-1865) 
 
In 1855, Russian authority was established over the Kyrgyz tribes in the Ysyk Kol valley and in 1865 
over the Kyrgyz in Chatkal, which was close to the Kokand Khanate. Interests collided and the Kokand 
Khanate was weakened by uprisings, unstable rulers and internal conflicts. The Tsarist troops 
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succeeded eventually and conquered Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand in 1868 and finally Kokand, Osh 
and Andijan in 1875. It took them almost two years to crush the popular resistance led by the Kyrgyz 
tribes in the Ferghana valley. The Russians eventually negotiated with Kurmanjan Datka that the 
tribes under her leadership would accept the Russian protectorate.82 
The result was the Governate-General of Turkestan that was administered by a military 
governor who resided in Tashkent. Tashkent became a ‘modern’ capital; the first of its kind in Central 
Asia. A Russian quarter was built – inspired by European city planning – which sharply contrasted the 
traditional native quarters. Between 1865 and 1917, eleven men served as Governor-General and 
Turkestan was divided into five regions (oblasts) and two protectorates. The regions were Syrdarya 
(centre Tashkent), Semireche (centre Vernyi), Ferghana (centre Skobelev), Samarkand (centre 
Samarkand) and Zakaspie (Transcaspia, centre Ashgabad). The two protectorates were the Emirate of 
Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva.83 
Morrison concludes that the Tsarist rule in Central Asia was however marked by a general 
lack of knowledge, money and power. It was therefore ‘far less effective, but also far more humane, 
than what was to follow after 1917.’84 
 
 
Biographical information on Kurmanjan 
 
During the lifetime of Kurmanjan Datka, the two Khanates of Kokand, Tashkent and Emirate Bukhara 
were fighting amongst each other. According to the introduction of the film, the Kyrgyz people were 
on the verge of extinction and ‘only 40 remaining tribes are still surviving in the mountains as part of 
Kokand Khanate under Bukhara Emirate’s ruler ship.’85 
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Kurmanjan was born in 1811 in the Kyrgyz tribe of Mungush near Osh – in an area covering 
parts of modern-day Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan – governed by the Kokand Khanate. Little is 
known of her younger years, only that she always had a close bond with her brother Akbalban. When 
she reached her late teenage years, she was to be married to a man of her family’s choice. 
Kurmanjan refused to marry him and returned to her father’s yurt which was against the tribes’ 
traditions.  
A conflict between the clans almost arose because of the marriage scandal, but local ruler 
Alymbek Datka (b.1799) stepped in. Alymbek belonged to the Bargy tribes and was local ruler of the 
Alai Mountains and surrounding regions. He was a nobleman that supported the unification of the 
Kyrgyz people as well as independence from other entities.86 Kurmanjan redeemed her family’s 
honour when Alymbek Datka married her in 1832. The marriage brought forth two sons and two 
daughters, though only the sons – Abdyldabek and Kamchybek – are portrayed in the film.  
In the film, Alymbek Datka expresses multiple times to Kurmanjan his desire to unite the 40 
tribes, as he says ‘it would be wonderful if we united and had a Great Assembly with all Kyrgyz tribes 
near this Sacred Stone. Then I will have no regrets.’87 The Khan of Kokand heard of the intrigues of 
tribes searching for independence and ordered Alymbek’s assassination for siding with the northern 
tribes. Alymbek was killed in 1862. According to the film, attempts were made on Kurmanjan’s life as 
well, but she escapes.  
After the death of Alymbek, a transfer of power took place and Kurmanjan became the new 
Datka. In this, she was an extraordinary woman as only very few women held this position 
throughout Kyrgyz history. Not much is known about these other women as they never had the 
authority Kurmanjan had. One difference was that Kurmanjan Datka was officially recognized by the 
Emir of Bukhara, the Khan of Kokand and by the Russians as the new ruler of the Alai region.88  
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In the following decades, the Alai troops and the Kokand troops have multiple conflicts and 
battles. The Tsarist troops expand more to the south and eventually the Kokand khanate is 
conquered. In the meantime, Kurmanjan attempts to unite the different tribes. In the film, this 
becomes clear in scene 23 where a middle-aged Kurmanjan reads a scroll in which her trusted friend 
and tribe leader Shabdan explains the unification of the Kyrgyz tribes needs to be completed through 
a Great Assembly.89 
However, the Kyrgyz are struggling in their fight with the Russians. It becomes evident in 
scene 28 that the Russians fought the ‘highlanders’ for years. Kurmanjan – who is referred to in a 
letter as the Alai Queen – has called for negotiations. She must have realized that the exhausted 
Kyrgyz people could no longer fight against the powerful professional Russian army.  
Russian General Skobelev was sent to the Alai region to tackle the negotiations. An 
agreement was signed that ends the Kokand Khanate and concludes that all territories will be under 
Russian control. The Russians vow ‘not to interfere with the lives of local people, nor the religion they 
profess. Persecution of rebels will stop. Prisoners will be released.’90 In the film, Kurmanjan is given a 
cloak, as a symbol of loyalty and submission. General Skobelev seems relatively friendly as he openly 
admires the strength of Kyrgyz warriors – ‘I always mention your warriors as an example to my 
soldiers’ – and their love for their Motherland.91 According to an interview with the president of the 
Kyrgyz History Society Tynchtykbek Tchoroev Kurmanjan was definitely respected, but she was also 
used as a tool to persuade the other tribes in the region to live in peace within the framework of 
colonial Russia.92  
As the years pass, General Skobelev made way for Alexander Nikolaevich Shvyikovski, a much 
less friendly figure who is evidently a different type of person. General Shvyikovski was determined 
to defeat the ‘natives’ of the Alai Mountains. It is eventually also this man who sentenced 
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Kurmanjan’s son Kamchybek to death by hanging in 1893 after he is accused of killing Russian custom 
officials. Shvyikovski obviously did not respect Kurmanjan Datka the same way as Skobelev and other 
Russian officials did. Even though there is no clear evidence against Kamchybek – already branded as 
‘criminal’ – his sentence is final. In scene 34, Kurmanjan even offers to take her son’s place as a last 
resort to save him but General Shvyikovski does not change his mind.93 
As Kurmanjan had already lost her first son in his search for an army in Afghanistan – accused 
of smuggling – she wanted to save her second son at all costs. The Alai men come up with a plan to 
save Kamchybek from his death sentence. However, Kurmanjan eventually realized that she could 
not save him. She had to sacrifice her own son to preserve the future of her people. Her sacrifice 
allowed her to negotiate and keep the Kyrgyz tribes together.94 Seven more Kyrgyz prisoners – 
including Kurmanjan’s brother Akbalban – were executed in Osh. Nine others were sent to Siberia in 
exile.  
A historical moment in 1906 is included in the film. Kurmanjan’s photo is taken by Baron Carl 
Gustaf Emil Mannerheim – later president of Finland – who travelled as an ethnographer from Russia 
to China via the Alai Mountains. Mannerheim took unique photos of Kurmanjan Datka. The photos 
inspired the portrait that features on today’s Kyrgyz banknotes.  
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Image 3 Kurmanjan Datka and on the left Mannerheim. 
 
 
 
Image 4 Portrait of Kurmanjan Datka on 50 som banknote. 
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Kurmanjan died at the age of 96 and is buried in a cemetery near the sacred mountain Sulaiman-Too, 
near the city of Osh. The sacred mountain – the only World Heritage Site of Kyrgyzstan – has a small 
mosque and is still today a popular place for local Muslims. Carved in the stone is also the National 
Historical-Archaeological Museum Complex Sulaiman-Too. Like many other museums, it was built by 
the Soviets in 1978 and celebrated ‘3000 year of Osh’. It contains many ancient archaeological 
artefacts that contribute to the somewhat fabricated history, but the museum also exhibits paintings 
and sculptures that are historical and cultural elements of Kyrgyz national pride.95 Close to the 
museum a square is named after Alymbek Datka and a Kurmanjan Datka street. In Gulcha one can 
find the Alay District Historical Museum which is named after Kurmanjan Datka as well. A stone 
twice-life size statue of Kurmanjan Datka can be found in Bishkek. She is wearing traditional Kyrgyz 
clothing.  
 
 
Image 5 Statue of Kurmanjan Datka in Bishkek. 
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Image 6 Statue of Kurmanjan Datka in Gulcha. 
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CHAPTER 2: Nation building since 1991 
 
This chapter will explore the nation building of Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s and 2000s. The Kyrgyz state 
has actively attempted to create a unifying national story for Kyrgyzstan, but this has proved to be 
difficult. The diverse population and tumultuous history prevent Kyrgyzstan’s development into a 
homogenous state. This chapter will elaborate on the political developments since Kyrgyzstan 
became an independent country in 1991. This was a turning point in its history because now the 
national government had to actively build the Kyrgyz nation and at the same time deal with its Soviet 
legacy. This goes along with the creation of symbols, national heroes and the use – and misuse – of 
history. The state had the primary role in this process of which most took place in the first decade 
after the independence. The state attempted to create unity by emphasizing the state and civic 
identity over that of the tribe and clan identity.  
 
 
President Akaev 
 
When Kyrgyzstan became independent, the country was led by Askar Akaev who had been elected by 
the Parliament in October 1990. In other Central Asian states – with the exception of Tajikistan – the 
leaders of Soviet Republics all won the first elections by considerable margins which only contributed 
to their legitimacy and authority. These leaders created obstacles for other candidates to bar them 
from participation and some – in the cases of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – ran 
unopposed as visible in table 1.96 
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Table 1 Presidential elections in post-Soviet states of Central Asia (1990-1991) 
 Uzbekistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 
No. of candidates 2 1 1 1 6 
Incumbent vote 87,1% 98,3% 98,8% 95,4% 56,95% 
Opposition vote* 12,4% 0% 0% 4,6% 33,1% 
* Voters had an “against all” option in all five presidential elections though, as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan only had one candidate running the choice was simply for or against the incumbent leader. 
This option was selected by 0,4% in Uzbekistan, 1,2% in Kazakhstan, 1,7% in Turkmenistan, 3% in Tajikistan 
and 4,6% in Kyrgyzstan.
97
 
 
One of Akaev’s first acts of president of independent Kyrgyzstan was the introduction of a broad 
range of political and economic reforms. Kyrgyzstan had to discover how to deal with a Soviet 
heritage that had brought deep political and economic crises, as well as how to deal with the 
continuation of ethnic conflicts and growing instability.  
When it comes to the Soviet legacy, Rafis Abazov argues in his Historical Dictionary of 
Kyrgyzstan that this legacy brought Kyrgyzstan real modernization, industrialization, urbanization and 
technological advancement throughout the 20th century.98 Investments had created modern industry, 
transportation, communication and agriculture. The change of the political and administrative 
system contributed to the creation of a ‘modern’ nation state, including its own flag, a national 
anthem and state institutions. All of this was done within the bigger Soviet framework.  
Abazov also acknowledges the negative sides of the Soviet system, in terms of the brutality 
and repression. The border delimitations of the 1920s that artificially divided Central Asia had forced 
an unwanted political system upon these republics. Cultural and historical traditions were ignored 
and the new borders were bound to create conflicts, whether based on ethnicities or on claims on 
historical heritage. The settlements of other nationalities in the region and dominance of these 
minorities in several cities marginalized the Kyrgyz in their own republic. The economic changes had 
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created industry and a monoculture in land cultivation, but it had simultaneously destroyed the 
thousand-year old agriculture of pastoral nomads. 99 
The Soviet ideology remained in people’s lifestyle and identity as well. After decades of 
Moscow’s identity policies and cultural assimilation, Central Asia now deals with a ‘Soviet’ and ‘Post-
Soviet’ periodization as a widely accepted time frame. These categories are used uncritically, as 
Diana Ibañez-Tirado argues in her article How can I be post-Soviet if I was never Soviet?100 After 
anthropological research in southern Tajikistan, she emphasizes how this periodization keeps Central 
Asians’ identities connected to the Soviet era, even if many young people have no experience of 
these years and therefore do not position their identities or worldviews in these terms.101 Dividing 
Central Asia’s modern history into these periods of ‘Soviet’ and ‘post-Soviet’ demonstrates 
limitations. It is hard to study history without dividing and categorizing the past, but according to 
Ibañez-Tirado’s research, periodization can become ‘intellectual straightjackets’ which influence the 
way we study and identify issues. Many aspects of life and identity in Central Asia continue to be 
classified as ‘Soviet’ or ‘post-Soviet’, but Ibañez-Tirado emphasizes these evidently need rethinking. 
Clearly, the question how to deal with the Soviet legacy is not yet answered. We can 
conclude, however, that the Soviet system did leave behind a base for development after 
independence, unlike what several European colonial powers left behind after their withdrawal from 
Asia and Africa. It was now up to president Akaev to reform politically and economically to evade 
more crises and to create a national consensus over the future of Kyrgyzstan. 
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Growing problems 
 
President Akaev gradually transitioned to the new political system and was re-elected – unopposed – 
in the elections of October 1991 which increased his mandate. He aimed to ‘revive Kyrgyz identity’ 
and at the same time stressed his role in representing all the peoples of the republic by using the 
slogan ‘Kyrgyzstan is our common home.’102 The ethnic Kyrgyz made up a mere 52% of the total 
population at this moment. President Akaev attempted to overcome the economic crisis by stressing 
the need for a market-based system. These tasks would not be easy and therefore he claimed that 
this required a new constitution and especially a strong executive power that was capable of pushing 
through the reforms.103  
On the 5th of May 1993 Kyrgyzstan adopted its first post-Soviet constitution in order to be 
able to continue the political transformations. Unlike several other post-Soviet states, such as in the 
Baltic region, this constitution guaranteed ‘citizenship and full political rights to all people of the 
republic without discriminating on language, residency or ethnic bases.’104 This is a first attempt to 
include different ethnicities in the new Kyrgyz identity.  
With the independence, the financial support from Moscow came to an end. At first, this 
caused an economic crisis in Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, inflation rose to 1200% in 1993. A program 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up to privatize businesses.105 The new Kyrgyz 
government was also financially supported by several western states to set up a more democratic 
constitution. The 1993 constitution would serve as an example for the rest of the region, but as time 
passed the political reforms slowed down and the system became corrupt. There were specific 
accusations of ‘tribalism’, a term that is often associated with corruption, according to David 
Gullette. In his book ‘The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic: Kinship, State and 
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Tribalism’, Gullette explains that already in the mid-1990s, political tensions had been growing and 
tribe-like formations were assuming more control in the field of politics.106 Several of President 
Akaev’s family members and close allies had acquainted strong positions in Kyrgyzstan’s business 
sector as they had easier access to resources, privileged information or control over means of 
coercion.107 
The IMF program did not have the predicted outcome. The decline of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) left much of Kyrgyzstan’s population living unemployed, in poverty and in famine. To 
protect and consolidate his position, president Akaev became increasingly authoritarian.108 Multiple 
referenda – in 1994, 1996 and 1998 – and resulted in multiple revisions of the constitution – all 
increased the power of the executive branch and limiting the power of other political parties.109  
Despite the growing corruption and power concentration around Akaev, the president was 
re-elected in the elections of 2000. Other possible candidates had been barred from elections and 
the image of Kyrgyzstan as an ‘Island of Democracy’ was tarnished as both the parliamentary and 
presidential elections counted many irregularities.110 
 
 
The Tulip Revolution 
 
The fraudulent parliamentary elections of March 2005 sparked protests in southern Kyrgyzstan. The 
corruption and failing economic reforms resulted in popular uprisings which were propelled by 
opposition politicians who had previously backed president Akaev. The demonstrations spread and 
reached Bishkek where thousands of people demanded Akaev’s resignation. The police was not able 
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to control the masses and the President’s office – the White House – was ransacked in what was now 
framed the Tulip Revolution (sometimes called the Pink Revolution). Akaev was granted asylum in 
Moscow. After ruling for 15 years, Akaev’s rule had come to an end.111 
However, the Tulip revolution did not bring about an enduring regime change. The northern 
elite of Akaev was replaced by the southern elite of Akaev’s successor Kurmanbek Bakiev. As Sally 
Cummings and Maxim Ryabkov state in their article on the Tulip revolution, the ‘revolution’ in 
Kyrgyzstan shows continuity instead of real change. A mere transfer of power and the repetition of 
old patterns hinder efforts of real reform when it comes to pressing issues such as corruption and 
equitable distribution of wealth.112 A comparison is made with the other ‘colour’ revolutions in post 
Soviet states and the same was reproduced there: revolutions have not provided enduring 
solutions.113 
Cummings and Ryabkov argue that the causes of this lack of real change in Kyrgyzstan are 
predominantly weak state institutions and the continuous question of ‘executive versus legislative 
dominance’ – also defined as ‘presidentialism’ – where the executive has concentrated power at the 
expense of the legislature.114 
Another observation the authors make is the prominent role for political elites and the 
‘informal.’ Cummings and Ryabkov argue that even though the revolutions are presented as 
something of the common people, they see a clear role for political opposition who used their tribal 
networks to rally supporters from their localities or tribes in their personal struggle for power.115 
Cummings and Ryabkov conclude that it were oppositional elites instead of civil society that ousted 
president Akaev.  
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President Bakiev 
 
President Bakiev – member of the nationalist party Ata Jurt – continued to use the corrupt political 
system and made sure his family and coalition members all gained high positions within the 
government or in the business sector.116  
As president, Bakiev attempted to create a new state narrative with several commissions in 
charge of finding the correct components.117 Bakiev ordered one of these commissions to work on 
‘guidelines’ for the state and national ideology in 2006. In this project, thousands of people and 
school pupils were interviewed and asked questions on what national ideology meant for them. The 
promising project was however disbanded in 2009 as the results showed no consensus. The 
guidelines were never published. 
The continuation of the corrupt system and few immediate improvements in society resulted 
in quick defections in Bakiev’s team of support. ‘The assassination of businessmen and parliamentary 
deputies has fuelled fears that Bakiev’s government is incapable of controlling the escalation violence 
in the country, unable to implement laws, and at worse, being involved in ‘mafia’ business.’118 In this, 
it seemed that Bakiev was just as much a product of the corrupt system as Akaev had been. A new 
opposition formed and the power of the masses was proved again as in 2009 protests against Bakiev 
started to emerge. It would lead to his downfall in 2010.119 
 
 
Post 2010 
 
Interim president Roza Otunbayeva held the office of president from April 2010 to December 2011. 
She had been an ambassador to the US and served as a foreign minister in the previous governments 
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of Akaev and Bakiev.120 After 2010 Kyrgyzstan made advances as the country conducted its first free 
and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. Political debate among civil society had grown 
more diverse and the media gained more and more independence. There were also greater 
opportunities for activism, nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s) and entrepreneurs.  
Even though Otunbayeva supported the protests against both Akaev and Bakiev, she herself 
could also not bring about big changes. Between April and June 2010 violence and conflict aimed at 
Uzbek communities returned and according to Erica Marat, this period was marked by ‘the lack of 
legitimate state leadership’ and ‘the provisional leaders’ inability to control the regime’s monopoly 
over the use of violence within the country’s borders.'121 
Civic activists attempted to move beyond the notion of titular nationhood and aimed to build 
a new identity based on civic values. They competed with nationalist policies that resonate with 
many ethnic Kyrgyz thanks to weak citizenship-based identity. In her article, Marat mentions a 2013 
study by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that explains that ‘while 
ethnic Kyrgyz consider ethnicity identity the most important determinant of identity, members of 
other ethnic groups put more emphasis on citizenship’.122 However, the activists who propagated 
civic rights reached one of their goals: adaptation of the constitution. It was no longer stated that a 
dominant ethnic group ‘makes up’ the state. The constitution now reiterates that all citizens have 
equal rights with rights to preserve native languages. That said, it should be mentioned that 
Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia to grant Russian the status of an official language. 
Otunbayeva’s successor Almazbek Atambaev – of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan – 
resurrect the massive ideological projects of the 1990s. His campaign posters included slogans like 
‘Together we are Kyrgyzstan’ which call for a unification of the country and resemble Akaev’s 
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‘common home’ ideology. Marat presents a quotation of a speech Atambaev made that shows the 
continuation of his civic rhetoric: 
 
‘We must build a new Kyrgyzstan where everyone can work, keep his/her family and set 
them on their feet, where everyone, irrespective of nationality, religion and social status, can 
feel equal and valuable.’123 
 
In 2013, Atambaev signed the ‘Concept of Development of National Unity and Inter-Ethnic Relations 
in the Kyrgyz Republic’ presenting a broad consensus on how to reconcile the competing visions 
within Kyrgyzstan after June 2010. It intends to serve as a blueprint to transform Kyrgyzstan’s legal 
code and the work of governments to foster diversity and national unity. The Concept aimed at a 
more inclusive language policy where the Kyrgyz language is the state language but linguistic 
diversity cheered on as an element of Kyrgyz civil identity, mainly to protect the rights of minorities. 
Russian served as the lingua franca among the educated elite since the 1950s and in the south Uzbek 
is widely spoken. The Concept is considered to be a balance between Atambaev’s moderates and the 
nationalistic opposition.124 
Atambeav’s attempts of creating a new state narrative of balancing the different powers in 
Kyrgyzstan led to the election of Sooranbaj Jeenbekov in 2017 – also a member of the Social 
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan. The battle between the moderates and nationalists continues as still 
today those who promote ethnic Kyrgyzness prevail over the activists that call for greater inclusion.  
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Demographic development of Kyrgyzstan 
 
The nationalist policies of the governments of president Akaev and president Bakiev aimed to create 
a feeling of community and belonging among the population of Kyrgyzstan. This would have been 
relatively easy if it wasn’t for the relatively large ethnic variety of the people. That makes the 
creation of one common identity difficult. Demographically speaking is the population of Kyrgyzstan 
divided in other ways as well besides along ethnicity lines. People do not automatically identify with 
the state, but rather with their own local or regional ties.  
Due to the history of the region, Kyrgyzstan has a high percentage of non-Kyrgyz. The 
populations of Central Asia blended firstly by the commercial and military influences of the Silk 
Roads. Secondly, in the 16th century different peoples in Central Asia adopted sedentary lifestyles, 
‘whilst the tribes in southwest Central Asia (Turkmen) and the inhabitants of the Asian steppe 
(Kazakhs/Kyrgyz) remained nomadic.’125 And lastly – during the Soviet years – the borders of Central 
Asia were altered multiple times between 1924 and 1936 and ethnicity became the basis of the new 
artificial nations.126 Despite several exceptions these national units were quite accurate as 86% of the 
ethnic Kyrgyz lived within the new Kyrgyz territory. The other 14% of the Kyrgyz population lives in 
neighbouring countries, such as Tajikistan and western China.  
As Sally Cummings shows in her work Understanding Central Asia, in 1989 only 52% of the 
population of Kyrgyzstan was ethnic Kyrgyz. The remainder of the population was made up of 
Russians (21%), Uzbek (13%) and smaller ethnic groups. This demographic composition has changed 
over the last 30 years. As visible on table 2, the percentage of Russians has declined from 21% in 
1989 to 5,8% in 2017. This decline is caused by an outward migration when end of the Soviet period 
left to anti-Russian sentiment and an uncertain future.   
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Table 2 Population of Kyrgyzstan 
Year   
Ethnicity   
1989 1993127 2010128 2017129 
Kyrgyz 52% 52,4% 64,9% 73,2% 
Russians 21% 21,5% 12,5% 5,8% 
Uzbeks 13% 12,9% 13,8% 14,6% 
Other* 14% 13,2% 8,8% 6,4% 
*Other includes: Dungan, Ukrainian, Uighur, Germans, Tajik, Turk, Kazakh and Tatar 
 
According to the latest estimates in the World Fact Book, the Kyrgyz population today counts around 
5.7 million people of which almost half is younger than 25 years old.130 Of this population 73,2% is 
ethnic Kyrgyz. Still, bloody ethnic conflicts return in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the Ferghana valley. This 
valley stretches across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Besides nationals from these countries, 
its population also includes Koreans, Russians and Roma. It hosts many religions as well. According to 
Svetlana Peshkova – who focuses on gender and Islam in Asia – most studies in the region have 
focused on Muslims, but there are also large numbers of Jews, Christians and Buddhists.131 Between 
11 and 14 June 2010, violence broke out in this area and it led to riots and looting. Hundreds of 
people died, mostly Uzbeks and over 2.000 buildings were destroyed. According to Sally Cummings, 
the reason for these riots were more societal-based than perhaps ethnic.132 The root of the problems 
was caused by the state that was neglecting the economic decline and the deteriorating living 
standards. Morgan Liu agrees and explains that Uzbek citizens – as well as many other minorities – 
experience discrimination in the nationalistic Kyrgyz state. People yearn for structural societal change 
especially in the fields of education, the labour market and economic and political participation.133 
However, Liu argues that in the later 2000s, the Uzbeks saw their status improving. In Osh and 
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Bishkek, ‘there was a noticeable increase during this period in public evidence of economic 
prosperity.’134 The relative new economic freedom allowed Uzbeks to gain wealth that they could not 
have made in Uzbekistan as conditions across the border were far worse. 
Kyrgyzstan furthermore has a north-south divide – caused by the mountains that split the 
country in half – which according to Robert Lowe is the ‘most apparent sub-national divide.’135 The 
north is industrialized and heavily settled by Slavic groups whereas the south is described as a more 
traditionally Asian and Islamic environment. 
A third division within Kyrgyzstan is the rural-urban split. Only one out of three Kyrgyz 
citizens lives in urban areas, mostly in the capital Bishkek and in the second city of Osh. The majority 
of the people live in rural areas that are signified by few people per square kilometre. The least 
populated regions are in the east and southeast near the Tien Shan Mountains.136 
Research on territorial disputes, identity and nationhood continue to be a substantial part of 
Central Asian studies. According to Robert Lowe, it is difficult to judge how deep these different tribal 
and sub-national allegiances are held among the people. They do trouble the formation of one 
national identity.   
 
 
National symbols of Kyrgyzstan 
 
Due to the lack of strong independent movements of nationalists in the region prior to the fall of the 
USSR, it was now the task of the post-Soviet regimes to establish nationalizing policies. Central Asian 
leaders use grand public events and symbols to justify their regime. Commemoration, monuments, 
museums and the reinterpretation of collective memory and history are ways of the state to unite 
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the sub-national groups into one identity.137 In the 1990s, the Kyrgyz state attempted to create 
national consciousness through recognizable icons and symbols, but also by reviving and 
manipulating collective narratives and memories. These projects can be seen all in one line and as 
predecessors to the endeavour of using Kurmanjan Datka as a nation building tool. 
However, it has been difficult for Kyrgyzstan to create national symbols that are accepted by 
all citizens. When the Soviets were in charge, they installed in Central Asia several elements of 
‘modern’ nation states. Each of the Soviet Social Republics was also provided with a flag. A national 
flag is the most recognizable and visible symbol of a country and should be treated with respect as it 
symbolizes the nation. Governments flow their national flag as an image of patriotism and flag 
elements often reappear in the coat of arms or presidential standard. The burning of a national flag is 
therefore considered a very symbolic act. A change of national flag usually occurs after a regime 
change, civil war or revolution.  
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, a modified version of the Soviet Red Banner was introduced in 
1952. It has a red background by which was added a white-bordered blue horizontal stripe through 
the centre. In the left top corner, a star, a hammer and a sickle appear which connect the Kyrgyz SSR 
with the Soviet ideology.  
 
 
Image 7 Flag of the Soviet Socialist Republic (1952-1992). 
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All the Soviet Republic flags had similar looks which created a bond. They shared their red colour and 
symbols and connected all identities under one Soviet umbrella. Each country had a small variation 
that represented the colours of their own location. 
When Kyrgyzstan gained its independence in 1991, the flag did not immediately change. It 
was first merely adapted and the hammer, sickle and star disappeared from the composition. It was 
not until the 3rd of March 1992 that the state replaced the flag with a new national design.  
The new national flag – that was supposed to unite the nation – has a red base, which 
correlates with the flag that national hero Manas is supposed to have carried in his battles. It 
represents bravery and valour. In the centre of the flag a yellow sun with 40 rays is depicted. The sun 
is a symbol of light, peace and eternity. The 40 rays represent the original 40 Kyrgyz tribes, united by 
Manas. At the centre of the sun is a stylized bird’s eye view of the tunduk – or roof – of a Kyrgyz yurt. 
It symbolizes the unity of time and space, the origin of life, hearth and home, and the Kyrgyz history 
as nomads. Few Kyrgyz live in yurts nowadays, but the image of the yurt still represents the 
traditional Kyrgyz home.138  
 
 
Image 8 Flag of Kyrgyzstan since 1992. 
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However, the 20 year old flag has been criticized. According to a 2012 newspaper article in the 
Washington Times by Tolkun Namatbaeva, the flag was part of a fierce debate in Kyrgyzstan. A 
special flag-changing commission was set up to research it, which included politicians as well as 
scientists, writers, designers and historians. Mar Baygiev – playwright and member of the 
commission – argued that the red colour is an inappropriate choice as it reminds the people of the 
blood that was spilled by Manas as he conquered communities of Uzbeks, Uighurs and other ethnic 
communities – groups that are still a very present in contemporary Kyrgyzstan. The flag supposedly 
refers to Kyrgyzstan’s turbulent and violent history as well contemporary conflicts in southern 
Kyrgyzstan. Karganbek Samakov – a member of Parliament – submitted a bill for the change of the 
national flag in March 2012 as he agreed that the red colour is associated with the blood of the 
people that died and went as far as suggesting that the red colour even contributed to the unrest.139 
Some critics claim that the red reminds too much of communism and the yellow seems 
almost like a sunflower. This is considered problematic as the sunflower is considered a symbol of 
dependence: a flower that turns to the sun that it needs to stay alive, reminding Kyrgyzstan of its 
historical dependence on Russia. A change of flag would mean a real break with the past 20 years. 
Yet others prefer to keep the flag as it is. Renat Samudinov – leader of a political youth group 
– claimed that this flag has been part of the two important revolutions Kyrgyzstan saw in the past 
decades. These protests involved a lot of young people who used this flag in their demonstrations 
and some ‘even lost their lives for this flag.’140 He believes that the discussion over the flag’s colour 
merely distracts from the actual problems which are much more pressing matters, such as violent 
conflicts in the Osh region or economic malaise. A change of flag won’t resolve the conflicts. Since 
the 2012 discussion, the state has not changed the Kyrgyz national flag. 
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Kyrgyzstan’s national emblem (image 3) can also be considered problematic as it features 
some Soviet components. The emblem has a round shape and in the centre a white eagle is depicted, 
spreading its wings.141 In the background, the high Tien Shan mountains are covered in snow – a 
reminder of the importance of the Kyrgyz landscape – and behind it a panorama of a radiant rising 
sun. The blue colour represents Kyrgyz courage and generosity. Around this scene are wreaths of 
wheat and cotton, Kyrgyzstan’s main agricultural products since the Soviet decades and underneath 
the name of the state in Kyrgyz written in Cyrillic letters. The design is undoubtedly inspired by Soviet 
symbols and imagery as the Kyrgyz SSR emblem (image 4) also featured wheat, cotton, the Tien Shan 
Mountains and the rising sun.  
 
 
Image 9 National emblem of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Image 10 Emblem of the Kyrgyz SSR. 
 
Although the current government may want to let go of aspects of the Soviet legacy, the symbols still 
resonate in official state imagery. This does not really benefit the state’s effort to construct a Kyrgyz 
national identity. The national flag of Kyrgyzstan does not succeed in its role to unite all Kyrgyz 
citizens. Ethnic communities of Uzbeks and Uighurs feel that this flag does not represent them as it 
reminds them of Manas’ victories over their ancestral communities.  
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Collective memory 
 
A second way in which the Kyrgyz government attempted to create a collective identity amongst its 
population is by emphasizing certain parts of Kyrgyz history which are mostly referred to as a nations’ 
‘collective memory’ or a country’s ‘national myth.’ They shape identity and the nation. This – often 
sentimental – common history can be a story of glory, but also of tragedy, suffering or sacrifice and 
often contains a moral or ethical element. Besides, these myths create a ‘true’ continuity between 
generations and ‘provide the reassurance that the national community of which one now forms part 
is solidly based in history.’142 However, these common memories are often highly selective. 
Remembering and commemoration are just as important as forgetting. In this way, the collective 
memories are distorted and leave out certain historical facts that could damage the collective and 
undermine regime legitimacy. 
It is a mistake to understand these national histories as the complete truth, according to 
Benedict Anderson. In his theory of nations as imagined communities, he states that we should see 
these myths not immediately as lies or fabrications of the truth, but simply as inspiring narratives 
which tell a people who they are or perhaps who they want to be. 143  
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the struggle for independence is presented and framed by the 
government as being ‘the strongest desire in Kyrgyz hearts.’ The independence of the Kyrgyz republic 
in 1991 is portrayed as the realization of a long held dream, by president Akaev whose leadership 
should therefore be supported.144 Kyrgyz national identity is partially formed with the help of 
historical forgery, stressing certain episodes and leaving out others.  
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Manas 
 
Besides the flag and national narrative, the state opted for a third case to encourage national 
patriotism. This is the example of the use – or misuse – of the Manas epic. After the independence, 
the state coined it the national epic of Kyrgyzstan which was acclaimed as the embodiment of being 
Kyrgyz. It supposedly contains all elements that exemplify the Kyrgyz nation such as perseverance, 
courage and again the eternal striving for independence. The idea is that everybody should be able 
to identify with these qualities of their Kyrgyz ancestors.145 Even though Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic 
country, all school children are taught the ‘seven principles of Manas’ in their Manasology class, 
which emphasize national unity, humanism, friendship and cooperation in harmony with nature, 
hard, work, education and defending the state.146 
Manas – now considered an actual 9th century historical figure – united the divided Kyrgyz 
tribes to defend against foreign oppressors – creating a sense of unity and national pride. The story is 
presented in a way so it implies that the contemporary divisions within the Kyrgyz society should be 
erased as well. According to Robert Lowe, the state policies that revived and promoted the 
nationalist reinterpretation Manas epic had the ‘intention that the epic tales will be considered “the 
Kyrgyz spiritual object” and the pivotal component of the Kyrgyz peoples’ mentality.’147  
Manas’ name and status as a national symbol is widely recognized throughout modern day 
Kyrgyzstan, on TV, in monuments and at schools. The year 1995 was promoted as the ‘International 
Year of Manas’ which was recognized by UNESCO. The authorities built a historical park – Manas 
Ordo – including a mausoleum near Manas’ supposed birthplace Talas, which is even visited by 
Muslim pilgrims. In 2014, Manas Ordo was visited by almost 150.000 people and it is therefore one 
of Kyrgyzstan’s main tourist spots.148 
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However, also this national icon does not speak to everyone in Kyrgyzstan. Nienke van der 
Heide acknowledges that on the first sight, Manas has great potential of being a national symbol. 
However, the story does have no positive references to non-ethnic Kyrgyz. The reinterpreted epic is a 
symbol for the Kyrgyz, not for the entire Kyrgyz population. It does not resonate with the civic 
approach of statehood that Akaev had earlier propagated in his ‘Common Home’ policies.149 Similar 
to the national flag of Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz national epic strongly promotes being Kyrgyz and 
therefore excludes non-Kyrgyz citizens.150 
 
 
Kyrgyz statehood 
 
Another event that was supposed to increase nationalist and patriotic feelings of the Kyrgyz was the 
‘2.200th Anniversary of Kyrgyz Statehood’ in 2003. Festivities were organized throughout the year to 
commemorate ancestral values that are considered the legacy that strengthens the state today. 
Historians surprisingly supported the idea of Kyrgyz as the ‘oldest nation of Central Asia, instead of 
challenging it.151 According to Suleymanov, ‘one might even argue that critique would be perceived 
as both inappropriate and unpatriotic.’152 In order to suppress possible critique, president Akaev 
legitimized the 2.200th Anniversary of Kyrgyz Statehood by referring to a United Nations General 
Assembly resolution (UN GA). It is true that the General Assembly passed a resolution on this 
celebration, but this resolution does not mention the ‘2.200’ years, but shows support only for the 
celebration of statehood itself. Kyrgyz politicians and historians certainly interpreted this resolution 
in their favour. The 2.200 Anniversary of Kyrgyz Statehood was an attempt to unite the citizens in the 
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concept of the state but the celebrations could not overcome political tensions that had been 
brewing since the death of demonstrators the year before.153 
The 2.200 Anniversary of Kyrgyz Statehood also did not appeal to all Kyrgyz citizens because 
President Akaev saw the celebrations as another moment to promote national Kyrgyz-centric hero 
Manas. During speeches, Akaev formulated seven principles – drawn from the epic – that became 
the core of his program for independent Kyrgyzstan.154 This way, Akaev presented the Manas epic as 
the blueprint of the contemporary Kyrgyz constitution, morals and ‘a testament for the Kyrgyz 
generations to come.’155 The term ‘statehood’ emphasizes civic identity and civic values but the 
involvement of Manas moulded the celebration into something for ethnic Kyrgyz only. In the words 
of Erica Marat, ‘Manas ideals prevailed over voices calling for greater inclusion’.156 The opportunity to 
highlight state identity could have been fruitful, but was eventually no real success. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the government of Kyrgyzstan launched different 
ideological projects in order to encourage the creation of national identities after Kyrgyzstan’s 
independence. Through educational institutions and mass celebrations, they promoted what they 
consider ‘Kyrgyz’ values. It is a way for the state to ‘spread the image and heritage of the nation’.157 
These are accompanied by the national story or narrative and through national symbols, such as the 
national flag. However, the discussed symbols only resonated to the ethnic Kyrgyz and not to non-
Kyrgyz people. In multi-ethnic Kyrgyzstan it is difficult to create a story or symbol that speaks to all 
Kyrgyz citizens. In the next chapter, the figure of Kurmanjan Datka is analyzed in order to see if she 
can unite all citizens of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 
 
                                                             
153 Gulette, The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic 9. 
154 Laruelle, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s nationhood’ 172. 
155
 Ibidem. 
156
 Marat, “We Disputed Every Word” 216. 
157 Suleymanov, ‘The Role of History in the Creation of National Identities in Central Asia’ 14. 
61 
 
CHAPTER 3: Kurmanjan Datka and nation building 
 
In this chapter, the image of Kurmanjan Datka is analyzed. After a short introduction on cinema in 
Kyrgyzstan, the question is how this particular film portrays Kurmanjan Datka. What sort of identity is 
she given and how does this connect her to nation building theories? These questions are answered 
in this chapter. I look at the theories that I have introduced and see how nationalist discourses are 
reflected in the film.  
One thing to remember is that the film Kurmanjan Datka stands in line with other nation 
building projects of the Kyrgyz state. After other projects had not reached their ideological goals, the 
state came up with new unifying narratives and symbols. 
 
 
Cinema and nationalism 
 
Cinema first came to Central Asia during the Russian expansion and the first film was screened in 
Tashkent in 1897. The film industry benefitted of Soviet investments in the 1920s and 1930s, but also 
suffered from its ideological control. Film makers were educated in Russia under the guidance of the 
Moscow establishment. Film production and distribution was regulated by a government institution: 
the State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino). 158 
These early Soviet films sketch an image of Central Asia as a backward place in desperate 
need of ‘Soviet salvation.’ Common themes in these films were the emancipation of women, 
redistribution of land and collectivization and the popular genre of the Central Asian adventure film. 
Documentaries emphasized the ‘exotic’ landscapes of Central Asia as well the different peoples of 
the Russian Empire and how to help them escape their backwardness.  
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Michael Rouland is a historian and researched nationalism, cinema and Islam. He writes in 
the introduction of a book Cinema in Central Asia, that ‘cinema was viewed as an effective means to 
inculcate and educate the population with images of modernity.’159 The Central Asian population was 
educated in hygiene, history and politics. Film had the power to shape the minds of the people of the 
‘periphery.’ Rouland describes how film was used as a combination of an art form, an entertainment 
industry and a mass medium that contains ideological notions. 
In the later Soviet decades, historical adventures and revolutionary heroism continued to be 
a major branch in Central Asian cinema.160 Films were made increasingly from a Central Asian 
perspective and national literature, epics and biographies were brought to the screen. In Kyrgyzstan, 
development went relatively slow as the first full-length documentary was only produced in 1946. 
Most productions were made in the 1960s and 1970s. Only since this period can we speak of real 
national cinema in the Soviet East, according to Sally Cummings. More Kyrgyz directors, writers and 
technicians emerged, as well as an indigenous critics’ culture. Besides, the Kyrgyz language was 
encouraged to be perfected as many films from other Union republics were translated into Kyrgyz.161 
Recurring elements in these Kyrgyz films were the importance of nature and landscape, collective 
tragedy, the maternal in national understandings and the powerlessness of the small community 
countering imperial Russia. Some of these elements together with symbols, myths and memories are 
detectable in Kurmanjan Datka. 
After the independence of the republics deep-rooted Soviet traditions remained strong. 
Kyrgyzstan had heavily depended on the Soviet economy and the economic crisis that followed the 
independence caused constant budgetary restrictions on film production in the 1990s. This 
continued until early 2000s, when according to Rouland, Kyrgyzstan placed its cinema on the map 
through international film festivals, with films from directors Ernest Abdyjaparov, Aktan Abdykalykov 
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and Marat Sarulu.162 However, Rouland also admits that state funding remained little and there is 
only a small domestic market. Kyrgyzstan is no longer experiencing economic crises like in the 1990s, 
but many people are poor and simply cannot afford to go to the cinema.163  
In 2004 the Kyrgyz government issued a law that required 0,1% of the state’s budget to be 
assigned to cinema. Multiple production companies were founded by the state and with the 
financing from the state several long-length films, short films and documentaries were produced 
each year.164 Film producers no longer study in Moscow, but at the Institute of Fine Arts in Bishkek 
which has a special department of Film and Television. 
As the Soviets knew, film is a powerful tool in nation building. Even though Benedict 
Anderson did not include film in his theory on nationalism, we can however use his theory if we view 
film as another modern means of communication. Anderson concluded that modern means of 
communication greatly contributed to the formation of nations. Film can promote ‘the titular 
national majority’ and combined with language, symbols and other cultural elements it contributes 
to creating a common sense of belonging. This can also consist of assimilating and incorporating 
other existing ethnic groups.165 In Cummings’ words: ‘cinematic works, in their distillations of time 
and space, contribute to the kinds of imaginings that sustain nation-state.’166 State-led film policy 
aids in the process of identity formation by establishing a sense of national identity, through myths, 
historical struggles and symbols. It is another tool for the state to show who and what the nation is 
and it projects this image on new generations.  
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Kurmanjan Datka: production and reception 
 
The film Kurmanjan Datka was made by director Sadyk Sher-Niyaz and was released in 2014. The 
world premiere of the film took place during the Festival des Films du Monde in Montreal in Canada. 
The film was the Kyrgyz submission for the Academy Awards in the category ‘Best Foreign Language 
Film.’ 
The production of the film cost $1,5 million which makes it the most expensive Kyrgyz film 
ever made. The film was partially financed by the state’s agency Kyrgyz Film and by the private 
company of director Sher-Niyaz, who is himself a former minister. Kyrgyz minister for Culture Sultan 
Raev was also involved in the production. Other financers were members of Parliament from the 
southern regions of Kyrgyzstan – where Kurmanjan herself was from – who persuaded the 
government to invest more into the new film. In an article on the website of Eurasianet before the 
film came out, Akmatbek Keldibekov – native of the Alai district and parliamentarian – said that the 
government ‘shouldn’t scimp on money… preserving our ideological values.’167  
Investments for the production of Kurmanjan Datka were spent on new equipment as the 
existing was very old fashioned.168 According to producer Jyldyz Joldosheva, it took two years to 
shoot the film. It was made without any special effects, which includes the scenes of the stunning 
landscapes and the tiger from Moscow Zoo. Nearly 10.000 people took part in the production, 
including a team of stunt horse riders and thousands of extras.169 It is no miracle that director Sadyk 
Sher-Niyaz described the film as a ‘national collaboration.’170 Special attention was paid throughout 
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the film to the traditional Kyrgyz costumes, music, dance and sports which create a sense of strong 
nostalgia towards traditional Kyrgyz nomadic lifestyles.  
 
 
 
 
 
Image 11 Promotion poster for Kurmanjan Datka 
(2014). 
 
 
 
 
Image 12 Promotion poster for Kurmanjan Datka 
(2014). 
 
 
Director Sher-Niyaz was asked about the film in several interviews. One of the main reasons for him 
to produce the film is the fact that Kurmanjan’s story contains many elements that would make a 
great film. “Her life is very dramatic and full of tragedy” and Sher-Niyaz elaborates on this by 
explaining how her whole life was a sacrifice for her country. She lost her husband and both her sons 
in her struggle. ‘We [the Kyrgyz] have to always understand the price of independence.’171 The 
director continues that the gender aspect appealed to him as well. The fact that a woman can make 
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it in a man’s world is exceptional. It is important for Sher-Niyaz because gender issues are very 
present in Kyrgyzstan in different ways.172 
 
 
Image 13 Director Sadyk Sher-Niyaz on the set of Kurmanjan Datka. 
 
According to Yunis, Kyrgyz historians have commented on the film. Having good intentions is not 
enough to produce a good historical story: it needs historical accuracy. They claim that several 
characters featured in the film were not alive anymore in Kurmanjan’s lifetime. Besides this, there 
were several comments made on traditions in the film that are not considered part of Kyrgyz culture. 
An example of this is scene 2, where a woman is almost stoned to death for being unfaithful, while 
according to historian Tynchtykbek Chorotegin this is not a Kyrgyz custom nor is it part of Kyrgyz 
Islam. A second example of a historical error is the fact that Kurmanjan is seen writing in a runic 
script in scene 23 and scene 37, which was only used till the 12th century.173 
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The film was a success domestically as well as it was shown in theatres for months after its 
release on Kyrgyzstan’s Independence Day the 31st of August. Just like the promotion of Manas in the 
1990s, the authorities of interim president Roza Otunbayeva proclaimed a year of celebrations: 2011 
was the Year of Kurmanjan Datka. In this year the production of the film began and it was also the 
200th anniversary of Kurmanjan’s birth. Otunbayeva also introduced an award – the ‘State Order of 
Kurmanzhan Datka’ – for Kyrgyzstani women ‘for outstanding achievements in politics and society, 
including “contributions to protect and strengthen the state and the unity of the people, the 
traditions of the people of Kyrgyzstan, and to bring up the younger generation in the spirit of love 
and respect for their homeland”.’174 Kurmanjan is – through this award – linked immediately to 
political achievements, the unity of the people and the role of the mother that brought forth new 
generations. 
 
 
Image 14 President Otunbayeva speaking with a depiction of Kurmanjan Datka in the background. 
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Professor of heritage and literature Elmira Kuchumkulova explains in an interview done by Alia Yunis 
that the film made Kurmanjan’s historical story much more popular. She clarifies that ‘many people 
looked forward to it [the release of the film] because they had read about her in history textbooks, 
but they did not have a clear picture of her.’175 We can conclude therefore that bringing Kurmanjan 
to life on screen boosted her popularity in Kyrgyzstan and contributed to her image as a heroine. It is 
since this rise in her popularity due to the film that she is remembered not only as a rightful Datka, 
but ‘also as Queen of the Alai, Queen of the South and, most of all, ulut enesi – mother – of the 
Kyrgyz nation.’176 
 
 
Kurmanjan’s image 
 
The question is now how heroine Kurmanjan Datka’s image is fabricated in the film to boost national 
coherence and how her image encourages and stimulates nation building. In the following 
paragraphs I analyzed some of the key scenes and recurring themes. Throughout the film, Kurmanjan 
Datka is portrayed in different manners. She is presented as a strong female figure. I analyzed some 
of the speeches from the film and explain how they contribute to Kurmanjan’s image of a strong 
woman that can lead and unite. I shortly demonstrate the other ways in which the nationalist 
discourse is displayed in the film. Lastly, I answer the question whether Kurmanjan can unite the 
people of Kyrgyzstan a second time through this film. 
The film begins with a narrator disclosing the history of the Kyrgyz people. It is explained how 
‘hundreds of years ago’ the Kyrgyz Khanate fell due to the conflicts among local clans and the 
invasions by others. This immediately confirms the tragedy and weakness of disunity of the tribes, 
which is a continuously returning theme in Kyrgyz history. Here an immediate link is made with 
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Manas as the first scene in the film is a manaschi reciting the epic.177 It is in this scene that 
Kurmanjan first appears on the screen – as a little girl – when visiting the recitation with her parents. 
Kurmanjan’s fate is therefore explicitly linked to the great mythical hero Manas and the Manas 
tradition. A cultural continuity is created between Kurmanjan as an actual living person and the 
legendary hero of the past. Kurmanjan is here clearly presented an extension and perpetuation of 
Kyrgyz tradition and culture.  
 
 
Kurmanjan as a heroine 
 
Kurmanjan Datka’s image of a heroine in Kyrgyz history comes forth in several scenes. The question is 
what characteristics make Kurmanjan a good heroine? If we look at the theories that were discussed 
earlier, we can connect her to the theory of Franco Zeno and Kathy Blau in their article Heroism: A 
Conceptual Analysis and Differentiation Between Heroic Action and Altruism. In their article, they 
describe certain character traits of heroes and make a division of 12 subtypes based on qualities such 
as leadership, representation, sympathy and place in collective experience or trauma. 178 
Kurmanjan fits in their first subtype – military and other duty-bound physical risk heroes – as 
she is involved in dangerous situations which she willingly and consciously enters.179 She enters the 
Russian camps to negotiate, which puts her in a vulnerable position. Kurmanjan is also present at her 
son’s execution. She puts herself in physical risk by exposing herself to these situations.  
The first subtype is closely related to the sixth subtype: political or military leaders. This 
subtype is typically an individual that leads ‘a nation or a group during a time of difficulty’, such as a 
war or a natural disaster. These heroes unify nations, provide a shared vision and are vital for the 
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survival of the group. This is the category that Kurmanjan fits in best as she is considered the one 
that united all the Kyrgyz tribes and led them out of their era of division. As Datka, Kurmanjan 
embodies the dream of her late husband Alymbek of bringing the tribes together. 
The tenth subtype is that is the ‘odds beater’ or ‘underdog’. Even though this does not seem 
very evident in the film, Kurmanjan is indeed an underdog because she is a woman. This already 
becomes clear in the first scene of the film where Kurmanjan’s parents ask the manashi for their 
blessing to have a child. The manashi asks why they have come for a blessing when they already have 
a child. Kurmanjan’s father admits that Kurmanjan is indeed their child, ‘but she is a girl.’ It is obvious 
here that girls are not considered as valuable as boys. However, when the manaschi asks for 
Kurmanjan, he says the following: ‘Your daughter is worth ten sons. Our country will need her 
tomorrow.’180 The scene is supposed to prove that even a small girl – a real underdog – can bring 
great promise and serve her country. The fact that – after this conversation – other villagers make 
fun of Kurmanjan’s father for this, contributes even more to the image of Kurmanjan being an 
underdog. In other scenes, Kurmanjan is again and again the only woman in negotiations and 
meetings – whether in Russian or Kyrgyz sphere. Kurmanjan is clearly an ‘odd beater’ as she seems to 
be the only female leader in the highly male dominated society of the Kyrgyz tribes. She overcomes 
these adverse conditions and becomes a model for others.  
 
 
Kurmanjan in a man’s world 
 
The way Kurmanjan fits into the heavily male-dominated narrative of the Kyrgyz nation buildings is 
also analyzed by Helge Blakkisrud and Nuraida Abdykapar Kyzy in their article Female Heroes in a 
Man’s World. Working from the point that nations are imagined and socially constructed 
communities, Blakkisrud and Kyzy consider the film Kurmanjan Datka as a way to ‘bolster patriotism 
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and national consolidation’ after the removal of president Bakiev in 2010 and the ethnic clashes in 
southern Kyrgyzstan.181 After the independence of 1991, Kyrgyzstan lacked a ‘readily available 
historical base’ on which a new national identity could be built. The authors illustrate how the 
constructed state-approved history curriculum has included only very few female heroes.182 In their 
opinion, the revival of Kurmanjan’s story is an attempt to create a new image to reconcile the nation. 
This is the reason the state heavily funded the production.  
In their article, Blakkisrud and Kyzy see Kurmanjan as one of the few women that has a place 
in national Kyrgyz history. However – just as the other female figures that they discuss – the figure of 
Kurmanjan is a victim of ‘masculinization’. She merely stepped in power when it was necessary and 
took the responsibilities that are usually associated with the male domain. As mentioned before, 
Kurmanjan enters an all-male realm: her interactions in the film involve almost entirely other men. 
Becoming datka was only possible for Kurmanjan because she was at first the wife of a prominent 
leader Alymbek. Before his death, she only participates in the political realm by counselling her 
husband in private. However, after his death, she becomes more than merely a bride or a mother 
and becomes a leader. Similar to the other female figures that Blakkisrud and Kyzy discuss, 
Kurmanjan is cast as an ‘honorary male.’183 According to Alia Yunis’ article, this rather manly image of 
Kurmanjan is debated by Kurmanjan’s descendents. In a small interview they explain how their own 
forefathers remember Kurmanjan as a feminine woman, who was caring and tender and had a 
cheerful personality. ‘In the film, she didn’t talk much and behaved more like a man.’184 
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In the film, the transfer of power from Alymbek to Kurmanjan is depicted by the birth of a 
child in scene 17. It represents the rebirth of Kurmanjan as a rightful leader. This new role for 
Kurmanjan is confirmed by Emir Muzaffar, who praises her for her wisdom and fairness.185 
Blakkisrud and Kyzy conclude their article by stating that Kurmanjan Datka is in their eyes a 
‘quick-fix’ national hero.  They argue her story was readily at hand; through the school curriculum as 
well as everyday nationalism. In the aftermath of the 2010 regime change and conflicts the choice for 
her is understandable: she is presented as a southern leader that was willing to make a great sacrifice 
for the Kyrgyz nation. Bringing her story to life does not seem to be aimed at women but serves as an 
example ‘to the (male-dominated) leadership (…) of the need to overcome petty rivalry and short-
sighted self-interests.’186 The authors deduce that perhaps contemporary Kyrgyz leaders should 
follow her example by putting ‘their personal aspirations aside, and work for the consolidation of the 
nation.’187 
 
 
Marriage and motherhood 
 
Kurmanjan’s role in Kyrgyz nation building contains another element that is related to her femininity: 
motherhood. As Nira Yuval-Davis writes in Gender and Nation, women are identified with nature, 
emotion and the private sphere. She argues that in nationalist theories women symbolize continuity, 
purity and the family honour. In the film, family and family honour are emphasized in the ritual 
before Kurmanjan’s marriage. She is washed by the other women of her family. A song is sung by one 
of the older women which demands Kurmanjan to preserve her fathers’ honour, respect her new 
father-in-law ‘as if he were a king’, and to be happy with her new groom. Her role as a new wife is 
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also to bring forth a new generation, as the song asks her to ‘rock a golden cradle very soon’ and let 
her family blossom.188 
However, Kurmanjan rebels against tradition and escapes from this first marriage. She has 
not ‘held up her fathers’ honour’ and her mother is upset with her, asking ‘how can we look people 
in the face?’.189 Kurmanjan redeems herself later as she marries Alymbek. This act of insurgence may 
however inspire and empower women today because Kurmanjan challenged existing patterns of 
female behaviour. Domestic violence and abduction in relation to forced marriage are pervasive 
forms of violence against women in Kyrgyzstan that have long been neglected by the government.190 
Kurmanjan’s role as a mother of her children, as well as mother of the nation, culminates in 
scene 39. After being imprisoned for 2 years, Kamchybek is executed on the main square of Osh. 
Kurmanjan wanted to save him, but realized that she needed to spare her people from an unequal 
match against the Russian army.  
Yuval Davis explains in Gender and Nation that in traditional nationalism men are associated 
with the rational, civilization and the public whereas women are associated with the emotional, 
natural and private sphere. Instead of acting on her emotions, Kurmanjan shows her rational side 
when she has to choose between her son and the future of the nation. She accepts Kamchybek’s 
faith and surrenders him to preserve relations with Russia. This is the critical moment of Kurmanjan’s 
legacy: ‘Kyrgyz widely believe the Russians would have utterly destroyed them.’191 
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Image 15 Kamchybek - played by Adilet Usubaliyev - moments before he is executed; a critical scene in the 
film and in Kurmanjan Datka’s story. 
 
 
Visual representation: the strength of a tiger 
 
Just after the prediction is made about Kurmanjan’s future in scene 1, little Kurmanjan spots a tiger 
lurking in the high grass and growling softly. The tiger returns several times in the film at crucial 
moments of strength and represents Kurmanjan’s spirit animal. As mentioned before, Central Asia 
has animism intertwined in its religious traditions. In multiple Asian cultures, tigers are part of tales, 
myths and worship. They are renowned for their strength, courage, ferocity and elegance and are 
considered strong and fierce animals. In many mythical or artistic perceptions, the tiger is the king of 
all other animals and therefore represents royalty. In Imperial Chinese art, tigers were used to depict 
the highest generals because of their stalking and hunting skills. The big cats are also one of the 
twelve animals of the Kyrgyz zodiac and there are several existing Kyrgyz tribes who believe they are 
descendants of tigers. 192 
It then makes sense that the tiger is Kurmanjan’s personification in an animal. It shows that 
Kurmanjan has a strong courageous personality – and already at a young age. The tiger returns in 
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scene 5, when Kurmanjan is escaping from her first marriage. As she crosses the river on her horse, 
the tiger is shown running and swimming as well. The tiger returns again when Kurmanjan flees from 
attackers in scene 15 and another time when her spirits rise in scene 37.  
The tiger returns for the last time at the very end of the film when Kurmanjan is already an 
old woman. The tiger however still sprints across the fields and suggests that Kurmanjan’s spirit is 
high and will always be alive. 
 
 
Speeches and leadership 
 
The film has some key speeches and letters that show Kurmanjan’s ability to lead and inspire. One of 
these key speeches features in scene 18, when Akbalban – Kurmanjan’s brother – is criticized by 
some Alai men who are concerned for their families and livestock as the Kokand army is approaching. 
They want to flee and save their families and themselves. However, Kurmanjan reminds the men 
what it really means to be Kyrgyz in troubled times: 
 
Kurmanjan: ‘Why do you men look so down? Sarymsak, you say you want to leave. Fine. Let’s 
give our ancestor’s land to the enemy. If so, do we have a right to continue our lineage? 
Kokand’s army is powerful and each life is precious. But aren’t the freedom of our people and 
the happiness of our children even more precious? You men may go. We women will stay. We 
swore to not let the enemy pass… Should the descendants of our great hero, Manas, simply 
run away?! It is better to die standing than to live on one’s knees. Kyrgyz people have never 
died lying in their beds during war. What can be more honourable than to die for our 
Motherland? Borochy, who will take care of your wife? Sanjarbek, where will your wife be 
safe? We have come here to stand with you. If you fight with spears, we’ll throw stones. If you 
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shoot, we’ll pass you arrows. If we die, we’ll die together. If we live, we will build our unified 
nation. What do you say?’ 
Villager: ‘To battle, men! Let Manas’ spirit support us. Let’s fight!’193 
 
In this speech, Kurmanjan touches upon the elements that are key to being Kyrgyz. She reminds the 
men that Kyrgyz people should never give up their Motherland because if they do, they have no right 
to continue their lineage. She then relates this to Kyrgyz hero Manas and stresses the importance of 
the freedom that Manas also fought for. She emphases the importance of unity and standing 
together to fight the enemy. In her eyes, women can join this battle as much as the men. This speech 
shows exactly why Kurmanjan could be a great symbol for the promotion of Kyrgyz unity as she 
mentions many key elements of being Kyrgyz: the importance of ancestors, national hero Manas and 
the continuous fight for freedom and independence; the very same elements that are stressed in 
nation building projects since Kyrgyzstan’s independence.  
Another scene has the same goal and effect is scene 23 where Kurmanjan reads a letter from 
advisor and tribe leader Shabdan on the Great Assembly and the expanding Tsarist armies.  
 
‘We ask God to give long life and health to Kurmanjan Datka, mother of the Alai people and 
devoted wife to Alymbek Datka, who strives for the unification of all Kyrgyz people. The time 
has come to unite with tribes living apart no longer fighting amongst themselves, set against 
one another by Emirs and enemies. Weakened by destructive wars, we were forced to accept 
the protection of the Russian Empire. Understanding that we wouldn’t be able to resist them, 
with neither sufficient people, not quantity of people, we accepted their proposal to sign a 
peace agreement. That’s why I warn you not to resist the Russian troops. Otherwise, 
hundreds of brave Alai warriors will be killed. In conclusion, we support the idea of unification 
                                                             
193 Sher-Niyaz, Kurmanjan Datka: Queen of the Mountains, scene 17. 
77 
 
and realise the necessity for a Great Assembly representing all of our people. I hope I’ll see 
you at the meeting. Shabdan.’194 
 
In this letter, the disunity of the tribes is considered a great problem in relation to internal and 
external threats. The plans for a Great Assembly should bring about the reunification of the people – 
something leaders of contemporary Kyrgyzstan wish to accomplish as well. Disunity makes the 
people weak and therefore weakens authority and autonomy of the state. ‘A strong united people 
makes a stronger state’ is exactly the message that the contemporary Kyrgyz regime would like to 
express and they promote that through this film. 
Kurmanjan’s vision for the future is presented in scene 40. The scroll which contains her text 
is read aloud at the Great Assembly. All the leaders of the tribes have come together to pay their 
respects to Kamchybek and acknowledge Kurmanjan’s sacrifice. The flags of the tribes are brought in 
and posted in a circle.  
 
‘An undying dream has been saving Kyrgyz people throughout the centuries and won’t allow 
them to disappear without a trace. That dream is to return our lost state. To achieve this 
dream many generations perished and many tears were shed. But the flame in our hearts 
have never been extinguished. No one knows which path to take in order to achieve our aim. 
Maybe we’re expected to fight for freedom beyond a human being’s strength but we must 
never relent nor submit. Mothers give birth to their children to serve the nation. Let unity and 
courage help us on our way. For the sake of our Motherland people must be ready to sacrifice 
loves ones..’195 
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Kurmanjan expresses the ‘undying dream’ of unification and longing for an independent state. She 
refers to the sacrifice made by many ancestral generations and the collective trauma that unites the 
community of the Kyrgyz tribes. Unity and courage are the keys in this speech. 
 
 
Other expressions 
 
Besides the figure of Kurmanjan Datka, the film has other nationalist expressions that are worth 
mentioning. Flags are featured often to show nationalities or allegiance. Each of the tribes at the 
National Assembly bring their own flag to the ceremony and they are all shown together in a circle 
when the assembly takes place. The Russians are clearly defined as one group as they all wear 
uniforms with authoritative emblems. This unity in dress also contributes the suggestion that they 
are numerous. 
Many important meetings always take place in yurts, the traditional nomadic Kyrgyz home. 
When Kurmanjan leaves her own family for her first marriage, thunder strikes as she exits her own 
yurt. Further in the film, guests are received in yurts and political discussions also take place here. In 
meetings, often horse milk and meals are offered to guests. These meetings sometimes involve 
traditional Kyrgyz music. Encounters between Kyrgyz and Russians in diplomatic spheres are 
somewhat cold.  
The film regularly shows other national symbols, such as birds of prey, horses, the use of bow 
and arrow and traditional Central Asian sports. National hero Manas is a continuous inspiration for all 
Kyrgyz warriors. The film opens with the manaschi and the ‘spirit of Manas’ invigorates the men to 
fight for their ancestral lands.  
There is a lot of attention for these lands as the landscape takes an important role in the film. 
As the film was made without special effects, many of the scenes are filmed outside and provide 
beautiful visions – especially in scene 15 when Kurmanjan is chased on horseback by Kokand men. 
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The relationship of the Kyrgyz people with the landscape also shows in scene 19 when confident and 
determined Alai men attack de-motivated Kokand troops in a sort of guerrilla style battle in a 
mountain pass, an environment nor unfamiliar to the Kyrgyz. The spiritual connection of the people 
to the landscape is expressed by Kurmanjan’s son who – as he is about to leave his home for 
Afghanistan in scene 30 – declares that his heart would always return him to the Alai mountains. 
When Kurmanjan’s other son Kamchybek is about to be executed, we see him staring to the Alai 
mountains in the distance one last time. As Jeanne Féaux de la Croix explains in her work Iconic 
Places in Central Asia, the landscape is the image of the Kyrgyz love for nature and the pride of the 
ancestral homeland. 196  
Another element to pay attention is language. The film shows through language how the 
Russian occupation played out. When General Skobelev visits Kurmanjan Datka in her home he starts 
his conversation in Kyrgyz. Yet – after formalities and expressing mutual respect – he continues in 
Russian to state that this is the language of business and politics. This reflects the current situation in 
Kyrgyzstan. Despite government’s efforts to promote the Kyrgyz language, Russian continues to be 
the language of officials. 
 
 
The figure of Kurmanjan 
 
In many ways Kurmanjan embodies the Kyrgyz spirit. Her representation in the film shows courage, 
strength and vigour. Like a tiger, she is considered a strong, yet elegant figure. Her image as a mother 
of her son contributed to her image as a mother of the nation. The personal sacrifice that she makes 
for the nation to avoid destruction and more bloodshed is a crucial element of her story. In a time of 
great difficulty, she stands up and sets aside her personal wishes in order to unite and lead her 
people to a new future.  
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However, we have to conclude that also Kurmanjan Datka is a heroine for the Kyrgyz people 
only – not for the entire Kyrgyz population, similar to the other nation building projects over the last 
decades. The national Kyrgyz flag led to discussion and so did the continuous emphasis on Kyrgyz 
hero Manas. President Akaev attempted to stress Kyrgyz statehood in the hope that people would 
identify more with the state instead of with their clan or tribe, but local and regional affiliations 
remain strong. Divisions among the varied population make finding a uniting element challenging.  
The choice for a film on Kurmanjan as a next nation building ‘project’ is logical as she came 
from the south and could therefore perhaps be a national figure for the Kyrgyz as well as the Uzbeks 
living in Kyrgyzstan. The government heavily funded this ideological film to bolster patriotism in 
difficult times as most Kyrgyz today are too poor to afford a visit to the cinema. It seems therefore 
that also Kurmanjan Datka does not have the ability to unify the fractured Kyrgyz state a second 
time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since Kyrgyzstan gained its independence in 1991 the Kyrgyz state has been struggling to create a 
universal Kyrgyz identity: an identity that would fit the titular nationality as well as the many 
different ethnic groups. However, the national symbols that were created were not able bring 
together the culturally and socially distinctive northern and southern citizens of Kyrgyzstan. The 
national flag – the most recognizable symbol of a nation – has been criticized for focussing too much 
on the ethnic Kyrgyz people only and other national symbols still refer to the Soviet times that the 
state is attempting to retire from. The nationalist reinterpretation of the Manas epic as Kyrgyzstan’s 
national epic was a success, but again for the ethnic Kyrgyz only. In the 1990s and early 2000s 
president Akaev and president Bakiev launched ideological programs to strengthen civic identity and 
encourage unity among the population, but these projects proved unsuccessful so far. On top of that, 
Kyrgyzstan long struggled with economic crises, poverty and corruption.  
The reason for presidents to launch nationalistic projects is partially that Kyrgyzstan is still a 
highly divided country where tribal identities and local affiliations persist. People identify themselves 
with their own community more than with the state. Besides that, non-ethnic Kyrgyz experience 
discrimination when it comes to job opportunities, education, economic activity, justice and political 
participation. The heterogeneous population has been formed because of several historical reasons. 
Commercial traffic along the Silk Road, changing lifestyles and the creation of artificial borders in the 
1920s all contributed to Kyrgyzstan’s diverse population. People’s identities changed during the rule 
of the Soviets as attempts were made to create one universal identity for all peoples in the Socialist 
Soviet Republics. These historical factors make it difficult for the state to come up with elements that 
unify all citizens and not just the ethnic Kyrgyz. And it is exactly history that plays such a pivotal role 
in nationalism and nation building. It is the bedrock of people’s identity because it answers the 
questions ‘who are we?’, ‘where do we come from?’ and ‘what connects us?’.  
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On top of that, inter-ethnic violence breaks out regularly and it seems that the state is unable 
reconcile. On the other hand, in recent years Kyrgyzstan has been developing a stronger civil society, 
political parties and other actors that claim their role in defining what the nation is or should be. The 
influence of Islam is increasing as well, as religion has always been a substantial part of national 
heritage in Central Asia. As Andrew Philips and Paul James conclude in their article: in the past, the 
‘nomadic ancestors were able to syncretise Islam with shamanistic practices, so too it is possible that 
contemporary Central Asians will be able to retain a layered sense of national identity in conjunction 
with their traditional identities.’197 
The film Kurmanjan Datka could be seen as another state financed project aiming to boost 
nationalist feelings and promote unity among the people. Kurmanjan is a female leader that united 
the tribes of Kyrgyzstan in a fight against oppressors. The film features intense speeches and from an 
inspiring underdog position, Kurmanjan Datka attempted to resist the forces that would take away 
the Kyrgyz freedom and independence. In her battle, she lost her husband, first son and had no 
choice but to sacrifice her second son as well. In director Sher-Niyaz’s words, Kurmanjan’s life had all 
elements for a film as her whole life was a sacrifice for her country. It is this combination of 
unification and sacrifice for the Motherland that make Kurmanjan Datka such a strong and powerful 
national image.  
We can conclude that also Kurmanjan Datka appeals to large part of the Kyrgyz population as 
was shown by the great success of the film domestically. However – just as the discussed other 
national symbols – the story of Kurmanjan most likely appeals only to the ethnic Kyrgyz. Even though 
I have not discussed it extensively, Kurmanjan might be an example for many women, who are 
inspired by her act of leaving her first arranged marriage and eventually marrying for love. Hopefully 
she will also inspire Kyrgyzstan’s future politicians: Kurmanjan Datka put the interests of her subjects 
before those of her own, something that the leaders of independent Kyrgyzstan have rarely done. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Scene description 
 
Note: 
The English translation of the film Kurmanjan Datka that I used, translated the Kyrgyz word for 
‘Motherland’ in the English ‘Fatherland.’ As mentioned in the introduction, Central Asian countries 
have a feminine personification of the nation and refer to it as ‘Motherland’. I have therefore 
changed ‘Fatherland’ to ‘Motherland’ in this overview of the scenes. 
 
Scene 1: 
Introduction 
Narrator: ‘Hundreds of years ago this land was named Kyrgyz Kaganat. As time passed with conflicts 
amongst local clans and merciless invasions by Genghiz Khan and Tamerlane, the great power of the 
Kyrgyz Kaganat fell. Over a thousand years, this former empire shattered into pieces leaving the 
Kyrgyz people on the verge of extinction. Only 40 remaining tribes are still surviving in the mountains 
as part of Kokand Khanate under Bukhara Emirate’s ruler ship.  
Visuals: a map of the former Kyrgyz empire shatters 
Manas epic sung: ‘carcasses of horses lie everywhere still, corpses of dead warriors form a hill. The 
ground is groaning from a grief that is so deep, bending trees inconsolably weep. A hero’s wife 
mourned for long. All widows accompanied her in a funeral song. I’m alone and don’t know where to 
cling, our hero passed away and he used to by my wing.’ 
Visuals: small Kurmanjan is present with her parents, who ask to be blessed with a child, after visiting 
holy places in vain. Her father admits they already have a child after questioned by the manashi, but 
‘she is a girl’, he answers. The manashi asks her to come to him and he says ‘your daughter is worth 
ten sons. Our country will need her tomorrow. Let the Lord give you a long life.’ 
Kurmanjan’s father is clearly irritated and her mother tries to calm him. Her father called a beggar by 
other men, told to get his kid out of the way and the men are name-calling: ‘ruler of the people’, 
‘future queen’.  
Kurmanjan spots a tiger in the field. 
 
Scene 2 (00:05:52): 
Kurmanjan has grown up. Asked if she loves her fiancé Kulseit, yet by her brother Akbalban. He 
doesn’t want her to marry him, because ‘he can’t ride a horse properly.’ Kurmanjan explains she was 
engaged as she was a child, Akbalban suggests to return the engagement earrings.  
Carriage comes by, with a woman in a cage. Woman tied to a post and men grab stones. Her hair is 
almost cut, just in time Alymbek comes in. Men explain they want to stone ‘this whore, according to 
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Sharia law’, claiming she committed adultery. Alymbek asks for proof and apparently two people 
have it. Young boy – her brother – comes from the crowd, saying she is innocent. Alymbek is told by 
the villagers not to violate Sharia law. He asks the boy for witnesses and he says that two female 
neighbours an conform her innocence, but the men say that a woman’s word is not evidence. 
Alymbek orders the woman to be set free. The men drop the stones, but they refuse to give her 
water. Kurmanjan brings a jar of water. This is the first time she lays eyes on Alymbek. Alymbek asks 
her about the text on the jug and Kurmanjan tells him she can read. ‘God bless you, Kurmanjan’, he 
says. Alymbek warns the men not to cut off hair or they will pay with their heads. He leaves.  
 
Scene 3 (00:11:34): 
Kurmanjan and her brother return home. Their father is angry with their mother, asking what her 
daughter was doing at the execution site. Mother says she went to fetch water. Father ‘an engaged 
girl shouldn’t give cause for gossip.’ 
Kurmanjan asks: ‘did you ever ask me if I wanted to marry Kulseit? As I told mother, I’ll never marry 
him.’ 
Father: ‘you have only one husband in front of God and the people. That is Kulsait’ 
 
Scene 4 (00:12:30): 
Singing, ‘on the hill where grasses sway, the hawk came flying in and wished to stay. People gathered 
for a feast under the moon, to see you off to your intended bridegroom. Our angel, keep your head 
proud and high. Preserve your father’s honour, never say anything on the sly. Show respect to your 
father-in-law as if he were a king. The home of your husband is your castle where to cling. Live long 
and be happy with your groom. May you rock a golden cradle very soon. Never separate from your 
groom. Rock a silver cradle day and night very soon. Let your family blossom like flower right away. 
Look after our daughter, protect her, we pray. Our angel, we now have a heavy heart, from how on 
we’ll live forever apart.’ 
Visuals: rituals of women and girls, burning small branches creating smoke. All dressed traditionally. 
Kurmanjan is being washed. Chest with possessions is locked. Kurmanjan is dressed and veiled. 
Thunder sounds as she leaves her yurt. She gets on a horse. Her mother asks her mother-in-law for 
Kurmanjan to be happy, to treat Kurmanjan as her own daughter, but the lady seems unimpressed. 
Brother Akbalban runs to her – for a final goodbye – and gives her a small knife. 
 
Scene 5 (00:16:42): 
Kurmanjan has arrived in her new home. She is offered horse milk, but she doesn’t want any. The 
women leave. Mother in law brings Kurmanjan’s new husband.  
He comes out of the yurt again and sits by fire.  
Kurmanjan hides in a corner, when a strange man comes into the tent. Kurmanjan takes out her 
knife. She throws the milk at him. There is a quick view of the tiger again which is growling and 
running away. 
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Kurmanjan rides her horse escaping. The tiger swims as Kurmanjan crosses the river with her horse. 
The tiger and Kurmanjan both make it to the other side.  
 
Scene 6 (00:21:22): 
Akbalban practises his bow skills, when he hears Kurmanjan’s horse. He guides her home. Kurmanjan 
looks certain and determined with her decision. The other women are shocked and surprised she is 
back. They drop their silk and follow her.  
Kurmanjan’s mother consoles her and gives her some food, but Kurmanjan hasn’t eaten in three 
days. She refuses her mother to touch her, clearly upset and angry. Mother tells her father is ill and 
there was nothing he could do.  
‘How can we look people in the face?’, mother clearly ashamed about Kurmanjan. Kurmanjan 
continues her embroidery, dresses her brother and gives it to him.  
‘Scarlet coloured silk is never left in the sun, your Highness. Silver is never thrown into the ash, your 
Highness. The swan is not hunted with a kite to catch, your Highness. And only you will be my perfect 
match, your Highness.’ 
Eagles fly in the sky.  
 
Scene 7 (00:24:46): 
Governor’s office, Osh. 
Alymbek has a hawk with a cap on. Alymbek receives a complaint, ‘Kulseit from the Bargy tribe has 
made a complaint.’ Alymbek laughs when he hears it’s about Kulseit’s wife. Decides to send a judge 
to Alai, judge Kudaiberdy to investigate. He is not aware it is about Kurmanjan.  
 
Scene 8 (00:25:37): 
View of horses coming over the mountain. Men prepare themselves for the arrival of the judge, who 
starts an argument: ‘Idiots, not honouring our ancestors’ customs!’, ‘We’re going to return your 
disobedient girl back to her husband’. They are asked if they let her run away from her husband at 
night. The men calmly ask if the judge wants to dismount and talk. They say that they will answer for 
it if the judge thinks they are to blame. They enter the yurt to discuss.  
At night, the women wait. Akbalban sits outside in the night, testing how far his arrow can bend.  
Kurmanjan is called in, but she is holding back 
Akbalban sends an arrow to the sky when another delegation arrives which is heard by the women. 
Alymbek comes into her tent. 
 
Scene 9 (00:29:48): 
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The next day, Akbalban is given a knife by one of the riders from Alymbek’s delegation. 
Alymbek and Kurmanjan ride horses together and their marriage seems certain. Akbalban shows his 
bow and arrow skills to come with his sister and join the guard of Alymbek.  
 
Scene 10 (00:31:14): 
Jump to the future. Alymbek helps Abdyldabek with his skills, then Kamchybek. Kurmanjan and 
Alymbek watch over them.  
Swords and weapons made. Akbalban makes a whip for Kurmanjan, son Kamchybek has his own. 
Akbalban shows him different woods, firmness of wood.  
Kurmanjan talks to the women, Kamchybek tries to get on a horse. 
 
 Scene 11 (00:33:37): 
Khan’s palace, Kokand. 
Alymbek visits. The Khan complains about the low taxes, Alymbek explains people cannot pay that 
much. ‘Most tax much be paid by Tashkent and the Fergana valley.’ Alymbek says that his Bukhara 
ruler has the same situation, but he is not tormenting people.  
Khan: ‘now when our Kokand Khanate is experiencing hard times, your northern borders, under 
Juntai’s leadership, are seeking freedom from us, trying to liberate themselves. Despite that, I believe 
you, and I think you won’t betray our common interests, my Datka.’ 
Alymbek is given a cloak and leaves.  
 
Scene 12 (00:35:34): 
Arrival of a group of people, including a crying woman who claims she only just lost her husband and 
his older brother wants to marry her. Albakban tells Kurmanjan women should not disturb a meeting 
and she is refused entrance. Alymbek notices her.  
He meets her later that day, showing her he still has her linen cloth, and a ring symbolizing unity. 
Alymbek says: ‘Our people have been broken into 40 tribes, 40 standards and 40 seals. It would be 
wonderful if we united and had a Great Assembly with all Kyrgyz tribes near this Sacred Stone. Then I 
will have no regrets.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Isn’t it possible to unite without destroying people’s destiny?’ 
 
Scene 13 (00:38:29): 
Riders with banners approach, a beacon is lit. 
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Ill Khan is visited by a doctor and is given medicine but he refuses.   
Man comes in, ‘people are coming from the Vergana valley, under Alymbek Datka’s leadership.’ 
Alymbek received by the Khan. Asked to come in, asked about journey, and his people. He is given 
milk to drink: ‘Dear Khan, let me begin with my concerns.’ 
Khan: ‘you have come to your brothers. Let us first celebrate your visit. Show respect to our 
traditions. I cannot let you leave without a celebration. During the feast we will talk.’ 
 Feast begins, music, horse riding, wrestling, food, flags. 
Alymbek: ‘here is the declaration for the unification of all our people.’ 
Khan’s son Shabdan addressed by the Khan, ‘my son, in these times of troubles, when the great 
powers restrict us from all sides, by capturing our land, we have to be united. Both Alymbek and I, 
have undertaken the responsibility for calling a Great Assembly of our people. Son, it is your duty to 
organize this meeting.’ 
Alymbek: ‘Khan, let us now go.’ 
Khan: ‘My son will escort you to the river crossing.’ 
Alymbek makes his leave by horse, with the Khan’s son. Riding through the mountains.  
At the river, they stop. Alymbek tells Shabdan to go home soon, because this father is not well. He 
hurries home. His father is sick again and dying. Khan: ‘Son, have you seen the guests off?’ ‘Yes 
father’. ‘They are your brothers..’ He passes away.  
 
Scene 14 (00:46:18): 
Kokand Khan receives the information that Alymbek has been north to meet Jantai, calls him a 
traitor. ‘A leopard never changes his spots. So he decided to unite with the Northern tribes. Invade.., 
I’ll invade Alai!’ His servant suggests beheading for Alymbek.  
Views of fog rising in the mountains. 
 
Scene 15 (00:47:10): 
Alymbek’s men realize they cannot find him and they realize that Kurmanjan is not with him either. 
They prepare the horses for a search. 
Alymbek is with a servant, on horseback, an hour from Alai, around prayer time. They stop near a 
small mosque. Alymbek washes his hands, his servant has to hand in his weapons. When they get 
ready to start their prayer, men appear from the small mosque. Alymbek realizes immediately they 
come from the Kokand Khan. He tells his servant to go and care for the horses, who questions him, 
but obeys. Alymbek: ‘Right now, this message is more important…’ (gives him the purple cloth), ‘than 
any life. Get on my horse. Go.’ He is allowed to leave and rides away. 
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 Alymbek spreads his prayer carpet and makes his final prayers. He prepares himself as the executor 
stands next to him, with his sword. He strikes. 
In the mean time, Kurmanjan is riding and sees men at the horizon. She commands her ladies to 
return and they ride fast through the fields, while the chase begins. They leave their possessions and 
the ladies hide in the forests. Kurmanjan is spotted and one of the men follows here. 
Beautiful slow motion views of Kurmanjan, looking behind her, clothes swirling in the wind. Exciting 
music during the chase on horseback. She enters a rocky mountainous area. She tries to get rid of 
him, but her perpetrator sees her. On a cliff edge, she loses her traditional headscarf hat. Her pursuer 
comes closer and together with the horse, Kurmanjan jumps off the cliff into the water. Short view of 
the tiger again, growling loud and the pursuer’s horse throws off his rider.  
Kurmanjan safely gets out of the water on her horse. Alymbek’s servant comes from the other side. 
Slow motion picture as he approaches her. Has he purple cloth with him for her. 
 
Scene 16 (00:57:23): 
Kurmanjan is in mourning, her 6 and 9 year old sons exclaim they also want to fight but that 
Akbalban won’t take them. ‘We’ll get revenge for our father.’  
Akbalban joins the riders who will fight. 
 
Scene 17 (00:58:16): 
It is night time. A woman is about to give birth. 
‘Heavens hear us now. Please bless us and hear us now. Let the child be born. Ease her pain. Stop this 
torment. Let her give birth soon. Don’t let her die. You’ll regret it. Heaven hear us now.’ 
Slow drums in background. 
A rider arrives with news for Kurmanjan. 
‘Kokand’s troops are approaching. No one knows what’s going to happen. Akbalban asks you to flee 
with the women and children.’ 
The child is born and the women start to pack.  
 
Scene 18 (00:59:54): 
View of Kokand’s troops. Camp of Alai troops. Akbalban and generals discuss their strategy in the 
mountains. They are approached by villagers: ‘tell me, the battle has not begun yet, but you’re telling 
people from your own village to run away! Secretly sending a courier to Kurmanjan… What about our 
families? Our livestock? Our crops? We also want to live and save our homes. If you want to fight, 
fight yourselves. We’re leaving!’ 
Kurmanjan arrives on horse with other women. 
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‘Why do you men look so down? Sarymsak, you say you want to leave. Fine. Let’s give our ancestor’s 
land to the enemy. If so, do we have a right to continue our lineage? Kokand’s army is powerful and 
each life is precious. But aren’t the freedom of our people and the happiness of our children even 
more precious? You men may go. We women will stay. We swore to not let the enemy pass… Should 
the descendants of our great hero, Manas, simply run away?! It is better to die standing than to live 
on one’s knees. Kyrgyz people have never died lying in their beds during war. What can be more 
honourable than to die for our Motherland? Borochy, who will take care of your wife? Sanjarbek, 
where will your wife be safe? We have come here to stand with you. If you fight with spears, we’ll 
throw stones. If you shoot, we’ll pass you arrows. If we die, we’ll die together. If we live, we will build 
our unified nation. What do you say?’ 
Man: ‘to battle, men! Let Manas’ spirit support us. Let’s fight!’ All men agree and yell in support. 
 
Scene 19 (01:03:46): 
Troops of Kokand are coming through the mountain pass. Kurmanjan’s troops are hiding and they 
attack. Fighting breaks out in a guerrilla style. There are some guns, but fighting is mostly done with 
swords and bow and arrow. The Kokand troops retreat and Alai men come out of hiding. 
Kokand khan gets off his horse and says goodbye to his horse. He attempts to get his men ready to 
fight on the ground. ‘Get up and fight.’ They look tired and unenthusiastic, compared to the Alai men 
who look ready and determined. They attack each other. Screen fades out. 
 
Scene 20 (01:07:21): 
Kokand Khan is questioned by his superior, ‘what did you achieve by assassinating Alymbek Datka?’ 
He says to the Emir that there was no other way.  ‘If Alymbek were alive, Alai would ..’ 
Emir: ‘I heard, how you attacked Alai. I also heard that in the canyon you were defeated by the 
woman. Who? Who carried out the execution?’ 
Khan: ‘A Kyrgyz man, named Choton.’ 
 
Scene 21 (01:08:30): 
View of market place. 
Alymbek’s assassin comes out, gets on his horse to come home but notices suspicious circumstances. 
It becomes clear that men are closing in on him. He tries to escape, but his horse is made to fall. 
Fighting breaks out and he is killed. They take his head.  
 
Scene 22 (01:11:41): 
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View of mountain pass, controlled by Alai troops. Men from Emir Muzaffar (Emir of Bukhara) try to 
pass, returning the mortal remains of Alymbek Datka to Alai, head of assassin as well. The road is 
cleared for them. Two men accompany the delegation.  
Kurmanjan thanks them and shows gratitude. ‘We would be grateful, if you could convey our 
gratitude to the Emir for fulfilling his Muslim duty and for his respect to the late Alymbek Datka. The 
people of Alai will never forget this gesture.’ 
Men: ‘The Emirate of Bukhara highly appreciated Datka’s fairness and bravery.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Dear Ambassador, your voice seems familiar.’ 
Ambassador: ‘we briefly spoke when you visited Bukhara with Alymbek Datka.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘your Honour, Emir. I apologise for not recognizing you.’ 
Emir Muzaffar: ‘Excusable. Quite excusable. In these times of trouble, for state security, I must travel 
like this.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘God bless you.’ 
Emir Muzaffar: ‘Our valiant friend Alymbek Datka was murdered by traitors. But his position won’t 
remain vacant. Another name is already known from Kokand to Bukhara, from Tashkent to Kashgar. 
Everywhere this person is known to be wise and fair. One Datka has perished, but another has been 
revealed. That’s you!’ 
Emir Muzaffar comes out of the tent, visible. The troops recognize him and present their swords. He 
rides away with his men.  
 
Scene 23 (01:16:23):  
Jump in time 
Older Kurmanjan reads a scroll: 
‘We ask God to give long life and health to Kurmanjan Datka, mother of the Alai people and devoted 
wife to Alymbek Datka, who strives for the unification of all Kyrgyz people. The time has come to 
unite with tribes living apart no longer fighting amongst themselves, set against one another by Emirs 
and enemies. Weakened by destructive wars, we were forced to accept the protection of the Russian 
Empire. Understanding that we wouldn’t be able to resist them, with neither sufficient people, not 
quantity of people, we accepted their proposal to sign a peace agreement. That’s why I warn you not 
to resist the Russian troops. Otherwise, hundreds of brave Alai warriors will be killed. In conclusion, 
we support the idea of unification and realise the necessity for a Great Assembly representing all of 
our people. I hope I’ll see you at the meeting. Shabdan.’ 
Views: tribe leaders meeting, discussing. Russian soldiers come in: represented with a canon, 
entering the cities, many men in uniforms to show their quantity. Swimming in the rivers, with their 
horses.  
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Scene 24 (01:17:55): 
Saint Petersburg, Russia. 
Meeting of important men who are discussing Russian’s next move. 
Mihail Dmitrievich: ‘Your Excellency, the only obstacle on our way to the British-Indian border is 
Kokand Khanate. Khanate is on the verge of collapse. We must use this opportunity to inflict a final, 
decisive blow.’ 
Excellency: ‘Dear Mihail Dmitrievich, do you really think that the conquest of Kokand will subordinate 
all Central Asia to our sovereignty?’ 
Dmitrievich: ‘Your Excellency, I’m sure of it.’ 
2nd man: ‘What will Europe say? How will England react? Won’t the Queen pursue retaliatory 
measures?’ 
3rd man: ‘Europe? England? Winners are not judged.’ 
 
Scene 25 (1:19:30) 
Inside a yurt, traditional music is played. 
Kurmanjan is outside, near a fire enjoying the music.  
Her sons are inside, with their wives.  
Riders appear from a distance. 
 
Scene 26 (1:22:15) 
View inside a yurt through the top. 
Messenger: ‘Kokand Khanate has fallen, my Datka! The flag of the Kokand army is now in your 
hands.’ 
Flag is offered to Kurmanjan Datka. 
Kurmanjan: ‘This flag is covered in blood.’ 
Son Abdyldabek: There isn’t a flag not steeped in blood, mother. Even so, at least we were one state 
with one religion. Do you really think the Russians have better intentions?’ 
Son Kamchybek: ‘Today you may stop the Russians. What about tomorrow? A Kokand’s sword may 
cut off your head.’ 
Son Abdyldabek: ‘Do you expect us to hide our heads?’ 
Son Kamchybek: ‘If Kokand officials valued a man, our father would still be here with us.’ 
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Kurmanjan: ‘Stop it, sons’ 
Son Abdyldabek : ‘No, mother. Kokand may have killed our father, but he died in the interest of the 
state. When the enemy stands at the gate, it’s not time for dwelling over the past.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Don’t be angry, son. Abdyldabek!’ 
Son Abdyldabek: ‘If any of you want to stop the enemy, I’ll be waiting at dawn at Janyryk Mountain.’ 
 
Scene 27 (1:24:07): 
Alai men see a traitor amongst the Kokand soldiers, Sarymsak, who had come to Kurmanjan to ask 
for protection. 
Sarymsak sense the ambush, he is shot, but not mortally wounded.  
Abdyldabek tells his men to mount their horses and they attack. However, the Russians are waiting 
for them. Canons fire, clearly more systematic planned warfare instead of random attacks. 
Abdyldabek sees his men are being hit, horses panic and he realizes it was a mistake.  
He sees Sarymsak among the men and attacks him with his sword, who begs him not to kill him. 
Abdyldabek raises his sword, but due to a cannonball coming in, he is blown off his feet. He is not 
conscious and men put him on a horse to retreat. 
 
Scene 28 (1:28:09): 
Russia 
Two men report to the Tsar.  
Man1: ‘Your majesty, the only obstacle in our expedition’s way are the Alai people under the 
leadership of Kurmanjan Datka.’ 
Tsar: ‘Kokand fell in 2 days. These highlanders have resisted you for two years.’ 
Man2: ‘Your majesty, the problem is the bravery and resolve of the savages.’ 
Tsar: ‘So then we have to increase the strength of our expedition’s forces.’ 
Man2: ‘Your majesty, according to the letter, sent by General Skobelev, there is another possible 
solution.’ 
Man1, reading the letter: ‘Our attacks result in big losses. Mountain dwellers desperately defend 
their land. I will soon have to temporarily stop operations. However, judging by information received, 
so Alai Queen – so-called Alai Queen – wants to stop the bloodshed and is ready to negotiate.’ 
Tsar: ‘General Skobelev is well aware not only of the battlefields in Turkestan, but also knows a lot 
about the Asians. Immediately inform Michael Dmitrievich that he is given authority to negotiate 
with the Alai Queen. I hope knows what he’s doing.’ 
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Scene 29 (1:30:11): 
Kurmanjan Datka rides to a Russian military camp.  Soldiers are training in the background, tents are 
up. 
Narrator: ‘The terms of the agreement signed between General Skobelev and Kurmanjan Datka are 
the liquidation of Kokand Khanate and the establishment of peace. Restoration of the Kokand 
Khanate is pointless. All these territories will be under the control of the Russian Empire. Russia vows 
not to interfere in the lives of local people, nor the religion they profess. Persecution of rebels will 
stop. Prisoners will be released. All occupied lands will be returned.  
Visuals: Kurmanjan Datka takes a seat behind a table and the agreement is signed. Victorious music is 
played. Kurmanjan is given a cloak.  
General Skobelev: ‘I must confess that I can’t help but admire the courage of Kyrgyz warriors and 
their undying devotion and love for their Motherland! I always mention your warriors as an example 
to my soldiers. Giving birth to and raising such brave warriors, you must be the happiest mother. 
Therefore, I ask you to consider me as your son.’ 
 
Scene 30 (1:32:32): 
Kurmanjan rides in the snow with her son Kamchybek to meet son Abdyldabek, who is asking her for 
her blessing.  
Kurmanjan: ‘Are you leaving your Motherland out of spite to the enemy?’ 
Abyldadek: ‘Don’t grieve, mother. I won’t stand for those unfaithful non-believers tramping down 
our land. I’ll go to Afghanistan and bring back an army to drive the enemy away.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘What can I do? After all, you’re a son of warriors.’ 
Abyldadek: ‘My heart will always return me to these mountains.’ 
He rides away.  
 
Scene 31 (1:34:21): 
Russians arrive in Alai settlement. 
General Skobelev asks how Kurmanjan is doing. She invites him to come inside the yurt to have a 
meal.  
Skobelev: ‘I have come to bid you farewell. I have been ordered to go to the Balkans.’ 
Translator present.  
Skobelev: ‘His Excellency, Alexander Nikolaevich Shvyikovski, is replacing me. I beg you to live and 
respect him. I hope you will find a common language.’ 
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Kurmanjan does not seem happy about it.  
Shvyikovski: ‘Isn’t this too much of an honour, Mihail Dmitrievich, for these natives? I think they must 
find a common language with me.’ 
The translate hesitates.  
Skobelev: ‘Everything will be fine.’ 
 
Scene 32 (1:36:25): 
Flags are collected. Kurmanjan approaches Eltoidu.  
Kurmanjan: ‘I heard you have been prosecuted by Kokand’s Khan.’ 
Eltoidu: ‘I see you’re well prepared for the Great Assembly.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Everything is ready. Only the yurts are left for Shabdan to finish.’ 
Eltoidu: ‘Alymbek Datka always dreamed about holding the meeting in his place.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘During my dreams whilst he was alive, a tiger looked after me. You must help me now. 
Take control over this Great Assembly. Let your friend, in another realm, be happy.’ 
 
Scene 33 (1:38:17): 
Russian border control, ‘suspected smugglers’ and Akbalban is ordered to open their trunks.   
Kamchybek’s wife is with the group and has to give the key. She starts crying when the Russians cut 
her hair off to get the key.  
Kamchybek himself is on top of a mountain. 
 
A Russian soldier finds an arrow in the ground, the bodies of the men from the border control are 
found.  
Kamchybek sees the group coming.  
Flashback to the scene at the border control: Akbalban fires an arrow at the Russian soldier who took 
the key from Kamchybek’s wife. 
Russian soldiers enter the scene. They compare the arrows and conclude that Kamchybek is the one 
who killed them.  
 
Scene 34 (1:43:42): 
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Local administration office 
‘Such a sentence is too severe, Alexander Nikolaevich. Take into account the high rank of this woman 
in the Ferghana valley, I..’ 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘Stop it, Mihael Efremovich. She’s an ordinary woman and she will do 
anything to save her own son. By the way, she’s due to arrive any minute.’ 
 
Door opens and Kurmanjan enters the room, is offered a seat. 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘I am very sad, that among the sons of a respected lady like you, is a criminal, 
who has gone against the Great Empire, dear Datka.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘There is no proof that Kamchybek was at the place of the crime.’ 
Translator: ‘She said her son wasn’t where the crime was committed.’ 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘According to wartime law, a commander is responsible for the misdeeds of 
his soldiers.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Punish me instead of my son, but please, don’t take his life.’ 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘It is impossible. A criminal must be punished.’ 
Kurmanjan rises and is close to tears. 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘Also, Datka, not long ago, some violators of the borders were captured. One 
of them clasped this thing to his chest and kept saying: Abdyldabek, Abdyldabek. Take it, maybe you 
need it.’ 
Alexander Nikolaevich takes a box from his desk. 
 
Kurmanjan leaves the building and visits the prisoners. 
Kurmanjan: ‘Is that you, Niazaly?’ 
Niazaly: ‘Yes, it’s me, Datka.’ 
Kurmanjan: ‘Where is the man you left with? Where is my son, Abdyldabek?’ 
Niazaly does not answer, but instead takes out his musical instrument and plays a tune. Kurmanjan 
realizes that he is dead.  
She leaves on horseback, ‘we lost Abdyldabek. I can’t bury both my sons at the same time! No matter 
what happens, save Kamchybek at any price!  
Music continues to play in the background as Kurmanjan makes her way home, visions of beautiful 
landscapes.  
 
103 
 
Scene 35 (1:48:34): 
Prisoners at night, arrow flies in. 
 
Eltoidu sits around a fire with two boys, of which one asks when his father will be freed. He admits he 
does not know what will happen. 
 
Scene 36 (1:49:43): 
Alexander Nikolaevich stares at a map of Central Asia.  
Asks his messenger: ‘Who else knows about their plan?’ 
Messenger: ‘Nobody, but you.’ 
Alexander Nikolaevich: ‘Well, war means war.’ 
 
Scene 37 (1:50:20): 
Kurmanjan lies in bed, clearly ill. Visions of roaring tiger and fire and a flashback to the first scene of 
the film where Manas’ story is told. Last view of the running tiger.  
She tells her servant: ‘Get me my inkwell and a scroll.’ 
Kurmanjan writes on the scroll. 
She revisits the place where she and Alymbek often sat, near a small water hole. She takes out the 
purple silk and ring that he had given her.  
 
Scene 38 (1:54:04): 
Kyrgyz tribes travelling to the Great Assembly, all carrying their flags.  
A messenger comes to Russian border control: ‘We are guests, going to visit Kurmanjan Datka.’ 
Border officers: ‘I know, Mr Shabdan.’ 
Messenger: ‘Good. Then why are you standing in the way?’ 
Border officers: ‘Circumstances have changed. I’m not obliged to tell you. Until I get an order from 
above, I have to stop you here.’ 
Messenger: ‘Stop us? Are you sure you can stop us?’. To his own man: ‘Turn back, we’ll go around 
another way.’ 
Man1: ‘The way back is closed. There are about 40 soldiers at the mouth of the gorge.’ 
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Back in the group: 
Man2: ‘There don’t seem to be many soldiers. What if we force our way through?’ 
Man3: ‘You want the Russians to kill us?’ 
Man4: ‘I warned you. Believing a woman’s word, you’ve endangered all our lives!’ 
 
Scene 39 (1:55:40): 
A Russian soldier prepares the gallows. Russian officers take their seat. Kamchybek is taken out of the 
prison and led to the gallows. The Kyrgyz crowd is restless. Military drums stop. In the crowd, 
Kamchybek spots some of his men, with their weapons hidden, but ready. From the arrow that was 
shot into the prison, he fabricated a small tool to undo the ropes around his hands. Outside, Kyrgyz 
men ride their horses.  
Alexander Nikolaevich almost gives the signal, his men stand ready in the tents to attack the Kyrgyz. 
Then, from outside comes Kurmanjan on her horse. She looks at her son. He stands proud, knowing 
the sacrifice his mother must make. She cries quietly and Kamchybek realizes he will die. The men in 
the crowd know as well that they will not continue their plans. Kamchybek looks at the mountains 
one last time and sees his father in the crowd. 
 
Scene 40 (2:00:14): 
All the Kyrgyz tribes are united in the Great Assembly. Flags are tied to posts. Kamchybek is buried. 
The scroll that Kurmanjan wrote is read aloud. All the different tribes are represented at the burial.  
Kurmanjan speaks: ‘An undying dream has been saving Kyrgyz people throughout the centuries and 
won’t allow them to disappear without a trace. That dream is to return our lost state. To achieve this 
dream many generations perished and many tears were shed. But the flame in our hearts have never 
been extinguished. No one knows which path to take in order to achieve our aim. Maybe we’re 
expected to fight for freedom beyond a human being’s strength but we must never relent nor 
submit. Mothers give birth to their children to serve the nation. Let unity and courage help us on our 
way. For the sake of our Motherland people must be ready to sacrifice loves ones..’ 
A quick flashback to the execution shows several officers standing out of respect, but not Alexander 
Nikolaevich. Kurmanjan leads the carriage with her son’s body away. The people follow.  
 
Scene 41 (2:03:15): 
1906 
Children gather to have their photo taken. Kurmanjan watches from a distance, on horseback. Her 
photos is taken as well. 
Photographer: ‘That’s all. It’s the last plate. Does this women realize we’re preserving her place in 
history?’ 
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‘This woman herself made history. If this day becomes part of history, then you and I will be there 
too, thanks to this picture.’ 
Kurmanjan asks her servant the name of the young man. It is Mannerheim. ‘Heaven bless him. He will 
achieve great success.’ 
She sees the tiger again, sprinting across a field in the mountains.  
 
End titles: 
‘Kurmanjan Datka died at the age of 96. In 1991 Kyrgyzstan became an independent republic. 
Akbalban and seven other prisoners were executed in the city of Osh. Nine others were exiled to 
Siberia. Emir Muzaffar, the last leader of Bukhara died at the age of 51. General Skobelev, after 
campaigns in the Balkans, died suddenly, under suspicious circumstances in 1882, aged 38. Alexander 
Nikolaevich Shvyikovski’s incompetence led to the Andijan Uprising in 1898. Mannerheim was 
promoted to Marshal and in 1944 became the president of Finland.’ 
The rest of the end titles show historical photos of the Russian occupation, Central Asian villages and 
cities. All photographs were taken by Mannerheim. 
 
 
